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Corporate governance is concerned with the enhancement or 
fortification of the rules and principles of company direction for the 
purpose of accommodating the modern environment within which 
companies operate, and the imposition of stricter checks and balances 
to curb or alleviate malpractice or wrongdoing by those engaged in 
corporate decision making. 
Tshepo Mongalo, Durban, South Africa, 20031 
 
 
Introduction 
 
South African scholar Tshepo Mongalo has defined corporate governance as a dynamic process 
to maximize efficiency and generate wealth, but one grounded in the statutory and common law 
history of governance as the process of controlling managers and balancing the interests of all 
stakeholders affected by the corporation’s conduct.2 His definition reflects the fact that companies 
operate within a regulatory framework that facilitates their wealth generating activities and hence 
they have civil obligations to the home and host nations in which they operate.  This approach to 
corporate governance seems particularly relevant for emerging economies such as those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where the risk of corporate malfeasance may be higher given the power 
imbalance between the host state and the multinational enterprises (MNEs) who engage in 
                                                 
* Dr. Sarra is Assistant Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. My 
thanks to Sarah Jones (Law II) and Danielle Park (Law II) for their assistance in background research for 
this paper.  
1 Tshepo Mongalo, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, A Global Picture of Business Undertakings 
in South Africa, (New Africa Books, Cape Town, 2003). 
2 Ibid. at 185, citing Job K Kihumba, Chair, Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust (Kenya) (2000), 
“Setting Governance Policies: Codes or Regulation?” (Global Corporate Governance Trust Conference) 
Connecticut, 10 July 2000, http://www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/Kihumba.doc).  
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productive activity in their countries.  The tension between the need to attract global capital and 
the need to address pressing social, economic and environmental issues in emerging economies 
frames the governance debate in a direct and poignant way.  
 
As a Canadian corporate law scholar who recently had the opportunity to visit South Africa and 
meet with some of its scholars, practitioners and citizens, I was humbled by both the profound 
challenges and the immutable positive spirit of the South African people when it comes to thinking 
about their economic and social future.  Hence while this paper is a reflective discussion on the 
kinds of challenges that exist and the strategies that could be deployed to enhance corporate 
governance in South Africa, it must be emphasized at the outset that it is for Sub-Saharan African 
nations to develop their own governance models.  They are best positioned to adopt strategies 
that align with their social, economic and political goals, and it is not for the West to impose 
Anglo-American conceptions of corporate and securities laws on developing nations.  While there 
are lessons, both positive and negative, from the North American governance experience, self-
determination of optimal governance strategies for emerging economies will allow them to take 
account of both domestic needs and global capital markets.  
 
This paper is divided into four parts.  The first part sets a context for the discussion, including an 
overview of the corporate law regime in South Africa and more generally, the challenges faced by 
Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic development.  Corporate governance cannot be 
discussed without at least some appreciation of the challenges posed by foreign direct 
investment, the level of debt of these nations and broader development concerns.  Much of the 
wealth of Sub-Saharan Africa has been mortgaged previously, creating enormous barriers to 
becoming independent in their economic policy choices.   Part II then sets out a framework for 
thinking about corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, briefly analyzing both shareholder 
wealth maximization and stakeholder models of governance. Part III shifts into a more specific 
discussion of corporate governance developments in South Africa.  In this respect, South Africa 
shares much in common with Canada in terms of its capital structure, corporate law and 
challenges of being a host nation for many multinational enterprises (MNEs) headquartered 
elsewhere.  The King II Report on corporate governance is examined in terms of its influence on 
shaping corporate governance policy in South Africa.  A more fulsome conception of corporate 
governance for South Africa includes empowerment, equity and the inclusion of African value 
systems.  Finally, Part IV looks forward, examining the possible benefits and limits of socially 
responsible investing through the new Johannesburg Stock Exchange SRI Index.  It also briefly 
discusses areas of further research that may provide assistance in enhancing domestic corporate 
activity in South Africa. 
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I. The Context 
 
A. South Africa’s Corporate Law Regime 
 
Several statutes govern corporate law in South Africa, the primary statute being the Companies 
Act which governs both public and private companies.3  Public companies must have a minimum 
of seven members (shareholders), and corporate entities can be members.4  Public companies 
must comply with the financial reporting and accounting requirements set out in the Companies 
Act, as well as listing requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) where the 
company is a listed company.  Where the public company is not a wholly owned subsidiary, if the 
number of members falls below seven and the members have knowledge of this, the statute 
specifies that the members shall be jointly and severally liable for payment of all debts incurred by 
the company for the period in which the number of members is below the statutory minimum. 5   
The constating document for companies registered under the Companies Act is the memorandum 
of association, setting out the capital structure, the process for appointment of directors, specified 
duties of directors, and voting rights of members.6  The company is also required to have articles 
of association.7  The Companies Act allows for both par and non-par value shares, similar to the 
corporations statute in British Columbia, Canada.8   
 
Private companies are limited to a membership of 1-50 members.9  Membership can include both 
natural persons as well as corporate entities.  The primary difference is that the right to transfer 
shares is restricted.  The shares cannot be publicly traded, and they are subject to such other 
restrictions as specified, such as preemptive rights.10  Private companies must raise capital 
privately, failing which the company is treated as a public company.11  Members of a private 
company can determine their governance structure in shareholders’ agreements, which are not 
public documents. Private companies are held to slightly less rigorous accounting standards. 
State-owned enterprises, parastatals, are regulated in a manner similar to public companies.12 
                                                 
3 South Africa Companies Act, 1973, as amended, No. 61 of 1973, 1973 SA Corporate Law 61.  See also 
the Financial Institutions and Insurance Financial Advisory and Intermediary Service Act, 2002 SA Fin 
Inst and Ins 37. 
4 Section 32, South Africa Companies Act. 
5 Sections 32-73, South Africa Companies Act. 
6 Section 52, South Africa Companies Act. 
7 Section 59, South Africa Companies Act. 
8 Section 74, South Africa Companies Act. British Columbia Business Corporations Act.  Until 2004, 
British Columbia was also a memorandum jurisdiction in terms of the structure of its corporate laws. 
9 Section 20, South Africa Companies Act. 
10 Whereas public companies must use “limited” as the end of the company name, private companies must 
use the designation “(proprietary) limited”. 
11 Section 20, South Africa Companies Act.  
12 Naidoo, supra, note 13. 
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The governance structure under the South Africa Companies Act resembles the statute’s British 
origins. The board of directors is responsible for oversight of the company.  The structure and 
power of the board is drawn from the company’s articles of association.  While the duties of care 
and loyalty by directors are not codified in the statute, the duty has been acknowledged at 
common law.  The Companies Act does contain some specific duties, for example, directors and 
officers have a duty to disclose an interest in contracts.13  There is also some codification of 
directors’ obligations when a firm is financially distressed, where directors have an obligation to 
minimize losses to creditors and may be personally liable for fraudulent or reckless trading.  
Section 424 of the Companies Act specifies that in the course of winding-up or judicial 
management, if it appears that the business of the company was being carried on recklessly or 
with intent to defraud creditors, the court may declare that any person who was knowingly a party 
to such actions is personally liable for all or part of the company’s debts.  “Reckless” in this 
context has been defined by the court as conduct that evinces a lack of genuine concern for the 
company’s prosperity, including failure to regularly attend meetings and carrying on business 
where in the eyes of a reasonable business person, there was no reasonable prospect of 
creditors being paid for the transactions.14 
 
The Companies Act requires a “company secretary” for a public company, with such an 
appointment optional for private companies.15  The company secretary is appointed by the board 
and has some of the characteristics of the role of “lead director” that is increasingly common in 
Canadian corporations. The company secretary is the principal administrative officer of the 
company. The secretary is responsible for ensuring that board procedures are regularly reviewed 
and followed in practice, and that all legal and regulatory requirements are complied with.  The 
secretary also works with the board chair and CEO to determine strategic administrative issues; 
and provides directors and the board with guidance on the discharge of their responsibilities in 
the best interests of the company.16  The role is often filled by the financial director, the auditor 
(independent of its audit function) or by professional companies offering this specific service.17   
 
The South Africa Companies Act allows for fundamental changes by special resolution, requiring 
21 days clear notice, a quorum being 25% present and voting, and a majority of 75% present and 
by proxy required to carry the vote.18  The board of directors approves the Annual Financial 
                                                 
13 Sections 234-237, South Africa Companies Act. 
14 See for example, Ozinsky NO v. Lloyd 1992(3) SA 396 (c). 
15 Section 268A-268I, South Africa Companies Act. 
16 King II Report on Corporate Governance, published 26 March 2002, at 2.10 (hereafter “King II”). 
17 Ramani Naidoo, Corporate Governance, (Cape Town, Double Storey Books, 2002) at 30. 
18 Section 199, South Africa Companies Act. For urgent matters, shareholders holding 95% of shares can 
agree to abridge the notice period, s. 199(3). 
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Statements, although they are presented to the annual general meeting for the members’ receipt, 
with 21 days notice.19  Members elect the directors and formally appoint the auditor.  Members 
have remedies under the Companies Act, including: relief from oppression; the ability to seek an 
appointment of inspectors to investigate financial interest in and control of the company; the 
power to impose some restriction on shares or debentures; and some power of investigation of 
the company’s affairs.20  The oppression remedy is similar to that in Canadian statutes.  Section 
252 of the Companies Act specifies that a member may complain that an act or omission of the 
company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable.  The court has broad 
powers to remedy the oppression, including making orders for regulating the future conduct of the 
company. 
 
The Companies Act also provides the mechanism to allow companies to offer shares publicly.  
Chapter VI of the Companies Act sets out requirements for offering of shares and issuing a 
prospectus.21 Companies must also comply with the JSE listing requirements, which include a 
requirement that companies comply with Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
(GAAP) as advocated by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants and international 
standard setting bodies.  The introduction of the STRATE (share transfers totally electronic) 
allows for the administration of share transfers by electronic means.22 
 
The appointment, removal and duties of auditors are regulated under the Companies Act, as well 
as other applicable legislation.23  The Companies Act does not require that an audit committee be 
struck, although companies listed on the JSE are required to have an audit committee. 
 
The Companies Act also makes provision for a special type of private company which uses 
“incorporated” after its name, in which the memorandum and articles specify that the liability of 
directors is unlimited in respect of contractual obligations incurred by the company for the period 
they are directors.24  Another statute in the South African system is the Close Corporations Act, 
which allows for limited liability companies with a maximum of ten members who must be natural 
persons.25  This statute has streamlined reporting requirements. 
                                                 
19 Section 302, South Africa Companies Act. 
20 Sections 252-268, South Africa Companies Act.  
21 Sections 142-169, South Africa Companies Act. 
22 Transactions in STRATE Approved Securities, http://www.jse.co.za/jse_initiatives/strate, last accessed 
May 4, 2004.  See also Rules of Share Transactions Totally Electronic Limited (STRATE), updated as per 
Government Gazette No. 24212, December 20, 2002; Directive SDJ, Rules for the Processing of Corporate 
Actions in STRATE, Special Gazette S5-2003, February 13, 2003. 
23 Sections  269-283, South Africa Companies Act. 
24 This form is frequently used by attorney, auditor and professional firms. 
25 Close Corporations Act, 1984 SA Corporate Law 69. 
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Other legislation also has a direct impact on corporate governance.26  For example, the 
Employment Equity Act, 1998 requires that companies above a specified size develop 
employment equity plans and undertake regular periodic reporting on progress in achieving the 
plan’s objectives.27 The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2002, requires that private 
companies, including registered close corporations, produce specified operational data.28  The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as well as environmental legislation, defines 
environmental rights of South Africans.  Section 24 of the Constitution specifies that everyone has 
the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and to have the 
environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promotion of conservation 
and ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.29  Depending on the outcome of these suits, constitutionally 
enshrined environmental protection rights may have a profound impact on corporate governance 
standards.  These provisions impose a duty of care on any party that directly or indirectly 
contributes to transgression of these rights.  Recently, there have been some class action type 
suits brought against corporate polluters under these provisions.30 A recent court judgment also 
held that companies may not be able to be ISO certified for particular activities where they have, 
previously violated standards under environmental legislation.31  These developments may 
sufficiently affect a corporation’s ability to engage in economic activity that greater attention is 
paid to environmental compliance.  
 
The King I and King II reports on corporate governance have also shaped governance practices 
in South Africa, considered at length in Part III.  Aimed at issuing companies, the King II 
recommendations offer a comprehensive approach to governance and in 2003, the JSE revised 
its listing requirements based on King II’s recommendations.   
 
B. Recent Governance Failures in South Africa 
 
Notwithstanding comprehensive legislation for the governance of companies, South Africa has 
experienced several major governance failures in recent years.  In 1999, the holding company of 
                                                 
26 For example, the National Environmental Management Act, No. 107 of 1998; the Insider Trading Act, 
No. 135 of 1998; the Public Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999. 
27 Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998. 
28 Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 14. 
29 Chapter 2, section 24, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
30 Naidoo, supra, note 13; citing as example the Thor Chemicals mercury poisoning case; the asbestos 
related claims against Cape plc and anti-pollution suits against Iscor for discharge of toxic effluent into 
unlined seepage outs and dams on the outskirts of Vanderbijlpark steel plant, at 7-9. 
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healthcare group Macmed was the largest corporate failure in the history of South Africa, entering 
liquidation owing 16 banks R1 billion in unsecured loans.32  There was a serious governance 
failure at Macmed.  Profitable operations were diverted to expansion of hospitals, with directors 
and auditors failing to flag the incredible drain on cash flow of this expansion campaign.  Financial 
statements failed to fairly disclose the financial status of the company. There were also 
allegations of insider trading. The liquidators brought a civil suit against four directors with a claim 
of R900 million, which was proceeding in 2004.33  There was also an issue of the former auditors 
not reporting the irregularities in Macmed’s financial statements when they were forced to resign 
as auditors three years prior to the collapse; reporting that would likely have prevented losses of 
millions of Rand.34 
 
In October 2000, the collapse of LeisureNet affected 5,400 full time employees and almost one 
million South Africans, many of whom had paid for lifetime or long-term contracts.35  LeisureNet 
operated 85 health and racket clubs in South Africa and through its various corporate structures 
had 17 subsidiaries throughout Europe and Australia.  It was placed under a winding-up order 
and a commission of inquiry was appointed to examine the dealings and affairs of corporate 
officers.36  At the time of its collapse, LeisureNet had debts totaling R681 million and its previous 
financial statements had failed to disclose R900 million in contingent liabilities.37  The two senior 
executives had also failed to disclose their interest in companies that LeisureNet had acquired, 
where they pocketed gains both from the acquisition and associated management fees.  The 
officers were charged with fraud and theft and with contravening section 234 of the Companies 
Act.38  LeisureNet’s governance failure is particularly significant because it had many governance 
mechanisms in place.  The audit committee had six chartered accountants on it, however the 
board as a whole had left the integrity of the financial reporting to the audit committee, without 
engaging in oversight itself.39  This illustrates the need to have the entire board remain 
responsible for the integrity of the financial reporting.   
 
A series of legal actions in connection with LeisureNet’s collapse are still working their way 
through the court system, including litigation regarding the scope of examination of corporate 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Ibid. at 134. 
32 One billion Rand. Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 94. 
33 Wiseman Khuzwayo, Macmed Civil Case will Begin Next Week, (23 January 2004), Business Report. 
34 Chantelle Benjamin, “Auditors turned blind eye to Macmed cover-up”, (08 May 2004). 
35 Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 34-35. 
36 Mitchell and Another v. Hodes NO and Others, 2003 (3) BCLR 253 (C) at para. 12. 
37 Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 34. 
38 Mitchell and Another v. Hodes NO and Others, supra, note 36. 
39 Naidoo, supra, note 13 at 50. 
 8
officers when those disclosures may influence criminal proceedings against the officers.40  In the 
proceedings to date, the Court has held that there is an inevitable tension between the right to a 
fair trial for corporate officers and the public interest in the proper investigation of corporate 
collapses. The Court held that a general immunity from use of derivative evidence would furnish 
wrongdoers with “immunity baths” contrary to the public interest. The Court found that a balance 
is achieved by direct use immunity and by leaving use of any derivative evidence a matter for the 
discretion of the trial judge.41 
 
Another example of corporate malfeasance was the collapse of Regal Treasury Bank in June 
2001.  An inquiry into the collapse of Regal found that the CEO and Board Chair Jeff Levenstein 
failed to act in good faith and with integrity in the best interests of the bank.  It found that he acted 
fraudulently and dishonestly, carried on the business in a reckless manner and that he had 
“confused corporate governance with thuggery”.42  The Chair/CEO engaged in self-dealing 
transactions, securing excessive cash bonuses, stock options and other benefits.  On the day 
before the bank was placed under curatorship, he had ordered R22 million of debts owed by him 
and his brother in law, Jack Lurie the former Chair, to be paid by the bank.43  Levenstein chaired 
5 of the 8 board committees, and he fired staff and removed directors who questioned his actions. 
The inquiry also found that the directors of Regal had failed to act diligently and to exercise the 
care and skill which is reasonably expected of persons of their expertise; that the directors had 
failed to ensure that the audit committee operated in accordance with the Banks Act; and that 
they had failed to challenge the Chair and CEO in his decisions.44  
 
The findings of the Regal Treasury Bank Inquiry resonate with the kind of super-egos involved in 
the Enron scandal in the United States, where the failure to challenge a powerful corporate actor 
meant that the usual oversight and supervisory role of the board was completely ineffectual. The 
Regal Inquiry also criticized the company auditors for failing to act in the bank’s best interests.  
The inquiry report led to 90 pages of recommended criminal charges, including 18 recommended 
counts of fraud against Levenstein and Lurie. The South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants pursued investigations into the chartered accountants of both LeisureNet and Regal 
                                                 
40 Mitchell and Another v. Hodes NO and Others, supra, note 36. The High Court Cape of Good Hope 
Provincial Division held that the purpose of an inquiry under section 417 of the Companies Act was to 
assist liquidators in discharging their duties and in their primary objective of ascertaining the assets and 
liabilities and recovering the assets and that the problem of the admissibility of derivative evidence was to 
be dealt with on a flexible basis by the trial court. 
41 Ibid. at 84. 
42 J.F. Myburgh, S.C., General Report (Independent review of certain governance aspects of South African 
banking sector), 30 April 2003, on file with author, at 19.  
43 Naidoo, supra, note 13. 
44 Myburgh, supra, note 42. 
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Treasury Bank.45  There have also been several other bank failures, notably Saambou Bank 
Limited in 2002.46  These failures have resulted in less capital available to smaller South African 
businesses. 
 
A further inquiry into the corporate governance aspects of South African banks, named the 
Myburgh Commission after its chair John Myburgh, reported in 2003.  The Myburgh Report 
advocated substance over form in corporate governance, but it emphasized that banks have an 
obligation to comply with the law, balancing economic performance with legal constraints on their 
activities. In 1999, the South African Reserve Bank established a Financial Stability Committee.  
Part of its mandate is to monitor the capitalization and governance of its domestic banks and 
other financial institutions.47 
 
The Nel Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Masterbond Group and Investor Protection in 
South Africa made a series of recommendations to enhance confidence in the securities law 
system in South Africa.48  It observed that public confidence in the accounting profession has 
been shaken, in part because of the failure of the auditing profession to acknowledge its role in 
detecting fraud, the perception of loss of independence, and the demise of several companies 
shortly after external auditors had signed unqualified audit reports.49  It recommended changes to 
regulation of the profession that would protect the quality of the external audit function, including 
an independent oversight function to encourage high professional standards.50 
 
There are also challenges for enforcement of corporate and listing standards.  For example, the 
JSE fined steel producer Iscor for failing to disclose share dealings by its director Lakshmi Mittal 
on a timely basis.51 Mittal is director and owner of a company, LNM Group, with 35% interest in 
Iscor.  The director engaged in self-dealing by purchasing close to R400 million in Iscor shares in 
the closed period leading up to announcement of the company’s financial results, without 
disclosing this purchase to the board.52  The company, not the director, paid the fine.53  If insider 
trading penalties are paid by the company, and as in this case, involve a controlling shareholder 
                                                 
45 SAICA to Probe ‘Errant” Cas, News24.com, http://www.news24.com/News24/Finance/companies, last 
accessed January 2004.  
46 South African Reserve Bank, Annual Report, 2002 at 7. 
47 South African Reserve Bank, Financial Stability Review, March 2004. 
48 The Honourable Mr. Justice H.C. Nel, Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Masterbond Group and 
Investor Protection in South Africa, Cape Town, April 2001. 
49 Ibid. at 328. 
50 Ibid. at 343. 
51 CFOweb, “JSE fines Iscor R200,000”, 
http://m1.mny.co.za/cfcgvn.nsf/0/C2256B5E00442C01C2256C41004BCFBA?OpenDocument. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Naidoo, supra, note 13. 
 10
who is unlikely to be ousted through the annual general meeting, the system sets up 
inappropriate incentives to reduce self-dealing transactions.  
 
These governance failures in South Africa are particularly significant.  They illustrate the gap 
between governance standards under a comprehensive corporate law regime and compliance 
with those standards.  A recurring pattern in the collapse of these South African companies is 
weak boards that failed to engage in effective oversight of the business and affairs of the 
company, and in particular, failed to ensure that senior officers did not engage in self-dealing.  
The inability of boards to act independently to discharge their oversight function is the result of 
numerous factors.  They create what scholar Marleen O’Connor has called “group think”, where 
key actors in the corporation create a board culture that rewards unquestioning agreement with 
executive decisions and discourages any independent role for directors to question decisions or 
actions.54   As with other governance systems, the challenge is how to create a culture of good 
governance that is principles-based and at the same time create effective enforcement 
mechanisms that act as a deterrent to misconduct and hold directors and officers accountable for 
any breach of their fiduciary obligations. 
 
The corporate failures of recent years have led to some reforms of South African corporate and 
securities law.  The JSE revised its corporate governance listing requirements following the King 
II recommendations. The JSE has been creating new avenues to encourage venture capital 
investments.55  The JSE has also started to de-list companies that no longer meet the filing 
requirements, in order to maintain public confidence in the capital markets.56  As with the colossal 
failures in the United States in the past three years, these initiatives raise the question of whether 
the corporate law system creates the appropriate incentives for corporate actors in their pursuit of 
wealth generating activity, a subject discussed at length in Parts II and III. 
 
 
C.  Development Potential and Barriers to Effective Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
In thinking about corporate governance in South Africa, part of the context that informs the 
discussion is the much broader issue of development in this region of Africa.  The economic and 
social situation of Sub-Saharan African states is a critical consideration in thinking about domestic 
                                                 
54 Marleen O’Connor, “Enron and the Perils of Group-think”, on file with author. 
55 One question is how to support small and mid-market companies in South Africa, in terms of dual challenges of size 
and location in a developing country.  South Africa continues to need access to capital, particularly in terms of venture 
capital.  The JSE has reported that it recognizes that the Venture Capital Market (VCM) and the Development Capital 
Market (DCM) have not been successful in providing this access and so it has launched a new initiative Altx in a joint 
venture with the Department of Trade and Industry. Http://www.jse.co.za.  
56 It de-listed 57 companies in 2003, ibid. 
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corporate activity and governance challenges in global markets, particularly given the serious 
poverty and the economic imbalance in power for these nations as they seek to strengthen 
domestic activity. Amartya Sen has suggested that development must be seen in terms of 
substantial freedom of people.57  Yet people who are economically, politically and socially 
disenfranchised are unlikely to experience this fulsome meaning of development. 
 
 
i. The Plight of Developing Nations 
 
The World Development Report 2000 on Human Poverty provides a snap shot into the 
challenges.58  78.4% of people in Ghana; 70.2% in Nigeria; 36% in Uganda and 11.5% in South 
Africa live on less than US$1 per day.59  The percentages of citizens that are not expected to live 
to over 40 years of age are: 21% in Ghana; 33% in Nigeria; 46% in Uganda and 30% in South 
Africa.60 Lack of safe drinking water and extremely poor sanitation conditions are major 
contributors to the mortality and morbidity rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.61  Even where there has 
been a reduction in infant and adult morbidity and mortality, the infrastructure necessary to 
support the resulting growth in population, including access to safe drinking water, adequate 
health care services, decent education, skills building and jobs has not been put in place. The 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is taking a devastating toll on the citizens of Sub-Saharan Africa and the lack 
of an effective prophylactic as well as the more general lack of access to health care services is a 
serious barrier to development. The pressure on Sub-Saharan African nations to address these 
urgent challenges competes with their ability to pay off international loans, creating irregular and 
uncertain public policy priorities and growing problems for both aspects of states’ commitments. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is facing complex pressures internationally. The shift in the post-colonial era 
to global markets is a shift that has a complex impact on different African nations because of their 
different size, history, political structure, social and economic base, natural resource base and a 
host of factors that make the challenges for each of these nations quite unique.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa has emerged in recent years from a prolonged period of colonization, in which colonizing 
individuals or their descendants directed not only its economic base, but also political traditions 
and structure, and a host of other social and economic activities.  This unique history, and in 
particular, the distribution of property and other economic wealth, informs current capital and 
governance structures of corporations.   
                                                 
57 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. 
58 World Development Report. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa’s debt grew from $84.1 billion in 1980 to $227.1 billion in 1996, representing 
three times the value of the region’s exports of goods and services.62  Africa still receives a 
disproportionately small share of foreign direct investment as compared with other developing 
and transition nations.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) usually involves a foreign investor making 
a direct equity investment in assets in the host nation, frequently with intent to manage the asset 
and with a view to medium to long term investment.  An example would be registering a 
subsidiary of a large multi-national enterprise, to undertake activity in the host nation and take 
advantage of the limited liability regime to limit any downside risk of operating in the country. Of 
FDI flows to emerging markets from 1990-2000, Africa received 4% compared with Asia, which 
received ten times that amount.63  Globally, FDI to Africa is only 1%.  The principal amount of FDI 
in Africa is investment in extractive industries in those countries that are oil and resource 
endowed.  For example, Nigeria, Lesotho and Angola account for more than 60% of FDI inflow 
into Sub-Saharan Africa.64  The G-8 Nations have recently pledged billions of dollars to promote 
FDI in Africa, yet FDI continues to be limited.65  Development aid to Africa fell 40% from 1999 to 
2001, from $17.2 billion to $12.3 billion.66  The combination of reduced aid and limited FDI has 
exacerbated the difficulty these nations face in moving toward economic self-sufficiency. 
 
Many problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are exacerbated by the weak financial sector.  In the 
search for capital to engage in productive economic activity, the financial system is an important 
component because it facilitates the exchange of goods and services, creates capital on a scale 
sufficient to meet the needs of the economy and provides markets for the transfer of financial 
assets.67  There is a need to have a well-functioning corporate and financial system in place, with 
appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, so that foreign investors are attracted to 
investment in the region.  Currently, the heterogeneity of financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the different stages of secondary market development, and the uneven distribution of currency 
and other markets, means that Africa continues to be considered high risk as a investment 
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strategy.68  While foreign investors must be offered a system that allows for diversification of risk, 
Africa needs to encourage long-term investment, in order to raise capital to build more 
sustainable infrastructure for corporate and social activity.  Equally important, Sub-Saharan 
African countries must devise a financial sector strategy that recognizes the incredible challenges 
posed by their status as developing nations, including distributions of wealth that are the result of 
long periods of colonization and discrimination.  As with corporate law, there will not be a stable 
financial sector absent regulatory mechanisms in place that protect property rights; that allow for 
monitoring and enforcement; and that allow appeal to judicial bodies that are impartial and 
independent where disputes arise between financial market actors.  Sub-Saharan African nations 
must also develop the infrastructure that will sustain a financial system, and provide skills training 
and jobs for those who will become the gatekeepers to the integrity of the system.  Trent has 
observed that FDI can arguably enable Sub-Saharan African countries to add to capital formation 
and increase total savings, which in turn could be directed toward debt reduction and funding of 
social programs.69 
 
 
ii. The Contested Strategies to Overcome Economic Inequality  
 
While a complete analysis of these challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, one must be 
cognizant of the connection between effective corporate governance and development concerns. 
There is a growing critique of development strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa, with strong 
normative disagreement about the appropriate course of action to relieve the poverty and 
underdevelopment.70  Any enterprise operating in Africa must take account of serious problems 
such as the incidence of HIV/AIDs, issues of access to water and housing, land redistribution 
problems, access to education, and access to credit or equity capital in growing businesses.  
More than 20% of the workforce in South Africa has AIDS or is HIV positive.71  Naidoo observes 
that with the current infection rate, the size and nature of regional markets in South Africa will 
change substantially in the near future.  South African companies have an extremely low level of 
public disclosure on social, health and environmental issues, with only 1% of South Africa’s top 
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100 companies producing separate reports on triple bottom line issues.72  One survey on 
corporate sustainability reporting ranked South Africa at the very bottom of 19 countries 
examined.73 
 
In terms of corporate activity and economic development, some scholars have suggested that the 
African managerial and bureaucratic class has been compromised by the direct economic 
benefits accruing to it from managers’ support and facilitation of global capital exploitation of 
resources, a form of “mal-development” in Africa.74  Hence there is a question about the capacity 
of state governments to effectively manage the development process.  Structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) formulated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reflect the 
interests of global finance as opposed to the African people. SAPs have required Sub-Saharan 
African nations to sell state enterprises cheaply, liberalize markets, devalue currency, reduce 
budget deficits and cut jobs.75  However, international loans made on condition that the nation 
restructures its economy may not appropriately recognize the particular challenges of adopting a 
developed country market economy in a developing nation. Some of the normative underpinnings 
are not valid because of the education, information and property ownership asymmetries that 
exist for the bulk of the population.  In some instances, because of the need to attract economic 
activity to the region, structural adjustment programs have created opportunities for MNEs to 
engage in environmentally harmful activities in relatively unchecked pursuit of profit-
maximization.76   
 
A critical issue is whether the current international debt load carried by Sub-Saharan African 
nations is a major barrier to economically sustainable development, and in particular, how it acts 
to deter domestic corporate activity.  The total debt of African countries rose from $6 billion in 
1970 to $210.7 billion in 1994, representing 82.8% of Africa’s GDP and 254% of its export 
earnings.77  The history of this debt load is complex, and different jurisdictions have different 
historical, political and social reasons for the volume, structure and repayment terms of the debt. 
There is evidence to suggest that much of the funding never went to development, but rather, 
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went to corrupt officials to enhance their own wealth.78  Hence states are required to repay debts 
for funds that were never beneficially directed to the country.  While this is not unique to Africa,79 
it is particularly exacerbated with the other economic, social and political challenges.  That these 
challenges of corruption extend to jurisdictions beyond Africa raises the question of the 
responsibility that the World Bank and other international funds or lending institutions have to 
ensure that those who are the beneficiaries pay the debt. 
 
In South Africa, the loans were made to apartheid governments, benefiting a small group of South 
Africans. Extremely little was ever directed toward development initiatives and toward 
ameliorating the lives of the socially and economically disadvantaged.  Today, the South African 
government is saddled with onerous repayment terms for benefits that accrued to only a few.  
The onerous obligations mean that valuable resources are directed away from developing safe 
drinking water, health care facilities, education, and a range of other social and economic 
supports and basic infrastructure that is required if South Africa is to become a sustainable 
economy.  This challenge is even greater in some other Sub-Saharan African countries. The 
difficulty with reliance on the World Bank and IMF loans is that the repayment and other 
conditions that were previously imposed have saddled current citizens with debt loads and 
repayment conditions that are almost impossible to meet.80  Massive international debt repayment 
obligations carry with them the inevitable consequence of poverty, famine and spiraling health 
care crises.  Moreover, the sheer quantum of indebtedness creates a situation in which Africa’s 
resources, which are abundant but limited, are being extracted, while only a small proportion of 
the wealth generated from this economic activity accrues to the millions of people living in the 
Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
It is estimated that in order for African countries to make a dent in poverty alleviation, they need 
to raise annual GDP growth to 7-8% annually, which in turn requires raising investment levels to 
25-39%.81  Yet Manesh observes that the capital required for development will not come from 
donors or from the banking sector in Africa because it traditionally specializes in lending on a 
short-term basis.  He suggests that long term capital must be raised through capital markets 
specializing in long-term debt financing and equity investment, and that such markets will not 
develop absent liquidity which allows long-term investment holders of shares and bonds to sell 
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with ease to maintain the appropriate diversity in their files.82  Manesh observes that the 
relationship between liquidity of markets and economic growth through savings, investment and 
productivity, holds after controlling for other social, political and economic facts that may affect 
growth in Africa, such as political stability, inflation, education, fiscal policy, the legal system and 
openness to international trade.83 Liquidity in the market can enhance investor confidence; 
however, liquidity can also cause uncertainty for the companies that heavily rely on equity 
markets because the value of equities traded on secondary exchanges influences the ability of 
the company to raise debt financing. 
 
Dr. Peter John Opio has suggested that Africa lags behind in economic development for two 
fundamental reasons; that there has been an inability on the part of policy decision makers to 
establish a meaningful fit between economic progress, power politics and the common good of 
society; and that there is a lack of synergy between political and religious institutions.84 He 
suggests that the failure of social market experiments led many African states to quickly embrace 
liberal capitalism in the hope of attracting capital from the World Bank and IMF.  This form of 
capitalism includes freedom of enterprise, the right to private property and a democratic system.  
As a result of this shift, Opio observes that the priority of many African leaders shifted from 
promoting the well being of the most disadvantaged members of society to concern about credit 
ratings internationally.85  Moreover, Opio argues that there is a disconnect between the 
assumptions of liberal policies on economic development in Africa and the political, social and 
economic experience on the ground.86  He suggests that unless the debt is cancelled, the debt 
owed by Africa is likely to soon exceed $300 billion.  This will mean that African countries can 
never develop or move out of extreme poverty because of the devastating consequence of debt 
servicing on society’s poorest and most vulnerable, who service the debt through their taxes.87  
Instead, new partnerships between all the economic, political and religious actors should be 
viewed as the means forward in development.  Opio suggests that this includes coherence 
between the political representations and daily reality, and suspending conditionalities to embrace 
the needs of the poor and disenfranchised, giving substantive meaning to respect for human 
rights and democratic processes, especially for African women.88   
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iii. FDI and Trade Liberalization: Magic Bullets? 
 
While few would argue that there is not a link between economic development and effective 
corporate governance, the nature of that link is highly contested.  A number of scholars, primarily 
from Anglo-American jurisdictions, suggest that foreign direct investment is the means by which 
Sub-Saharan Africa will most rapidly develop.89  For example, the use of robotics and other 
advanced technology by General Motors and other MNEs in South Africa has allowed South 
Africa to sustain its market dominance within Sub-Saharan Africa.90  Others have observed that 
revised foreign aid and debt forgiveness as strategies are not sufficient and that Sub-Saharan 
African countries need to become viable participants in global capital markets.91  Bonaglia and 
Fukasaku have argued that there is a need for local business plans that improve local conditions 
for international business and create a strategy for export diversification.92  For example, the 
liberalization of Uganda’s economy resulted in an influx of foreign investment in the late 1990’s 
and a growth in GDP to 8% per annum from 1992-1995, although its overall debt continued to 
grow due to onerous servicing charges.93 
 
Initiatives outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as the U.S. Africa Growth Opportunity Act are 
aimed at increasing foreign investment and enhancing trade relations between the U.S. and 
African nations. The statute is aimed at eliminating barriers to free trade, increasing privatization 
and gaining market share in the African economy.94  However, Trent observes that one of the first 
eligibility requirements is that the host nation agrees to minimize government interference in the 
economy through reducing or eliminating measures such as price controls, subsidies and 
government ownership of enterprises.95  Hence there is some loss of state regulatory control that 
the U.S. is seeking as a prerequisite to providing funding.  While the Africa Growth Opportunity 
Act may assist in bringing much needed capital to Africa, it is unclear at what price.  Foreign 
investment does allow capital to flow into Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as contributing to the host 
nation some technological, labour skills development, managerial skills sharing and other 
advances.96  The control exercised by the foreign investor over the corporate entity means a loss 
of economic control by the host nation.  This is exacerbated by the loss of regulatory control from 
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the up-front conditions imposed on host nations in order that capital flows in.  Host nations 
already face severe problems in terms of regulating the activities of MNEs within their jurisdiction, 
and the onerous access criteria under the Africa Growth Opportunity Act could exacerbate an 
already serious problem. 
 
Access to global markets can be a positive factor.  Domestic corporations can raise capital 
effectively, allowing expansion of their wealth generating activities.  Investors get the upside value 
of wealth generated through dividends, and jobs and other economic benefits accrue to the 
community.  However, the control issue remains unresolved.  Domestic corporations face a loss 
of control because of dependence on global capital markets, or they are replaced in the market 
by subsidiaries that are registered in the host nation as a separate entity, but have the 
competitive advantage of having economies of scale and market access through large MNEs.  
Moreover, the capital flows out from productive activity may be highly problematic for future 
economic sustainability of the Sub-Saharan African nation, with the risk that any upside benefits 
from the activity accrue only to foreign investors.  This creates a cycle in which poverty, serious 
health issues and environmental protection are not addressed, in addition to weakening domestic 
corporations and hence the potential for further economic development.  
 
As Sub-Saharan African nations have moved, at least in principle, towards more mixed-market 
economies, they have embraced a number of Anglo-American strategies including price 
deregulation, privatization, freer international trade, and a dismantling of state enterprises and 
civil services.  While these strategies are contested in developed countries, it is evident that they 
have been adopted or imposed in Africa without a closer consideration of whether or not they are 
development enhancing.  Moreover, there is inadequate attention paid to the difference between 
development and self-sustainability.  Development that is externally controlled may allow MNEs 
to extract excessive rents.  Combined with co-operation or inability of host nations to secure any 
better bargain, benefits that should be directed to economic sustainability can exit the nation in 
the form of dividends to investors or in debt repayment. 
 
Trade liberalization and aid tied to it can negatively affect development efforts.  In Ghana, Opio 
has observed that the emphasis on cocoa production has exacerbated regional and local income 
disparities, with 18% of the farming sector receiving 46% of government funding support, 
resulting in a declining ability for food self-sufficiency in the nation.97  Liberalization policies and 
exchange rate adjustments resulted in farmers of food crops being hit by cheap imports of rice 
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and other cash crops, making local farmers extremely vulnerable to private sector food 
monopolies.98 
 
There is the further element of the complex political structure and history of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
with the result that these countries continue to be labeled as high risk for investment.  This 
increases the cost of capital, in turn directly affecting the potential for self-sustaining 
development.  A number of countries have made incredible advances in their democratic 
processes in the past decade, yet there is continued political and social strife.  This uncertainty 
may bear directly on the development of models of corporate governance that will ultimately 
assist in generating wealth for the nation state.  
  
 
iv. Sustainable Economic Development 
 
Finally, a core issue for corporate governance is sustainability and in particular, the intersection 
between resource extraction, environmental protection and long-term economic sustainability.  
This is particularly critical in countries like South Africa, in which resource extraction is a main 
source of wealth creation and jobs.  There are increasing environmental problems in Sub-
Saharan Africa due to growing population and the pressures created by population shifts from 
rural to urban areas in search of jobs.  There is need to ameliorate agricultural and other land use 
conditions due to extreme weather conditions, erosion of land, dilution of nutrients from the land 
and creation of further non-agricultural land through changing ecological conditions.  These 
challenges are exacerbated with the shift to cash crop economies and the draining of wetlands by 
commercial agricultural enterprises.  While long term sustainability of agricultural land is an 
urgent priority, the lack of energy alternatives and limited land supply have policy makers making 
difficult choices between feeding hungry populations and concern about long-term environmental 
sustainability.  There is also a lack of empirical research regarding the very diverse types of 
environmental challenges in regions that encompass deserts to tropical rain forests.  While 
developed nations also face the issue of long-term environmental sustainability with difficult public 
policy choices, the consequences of these choices are multiplied in nations where the 
population’s immediate basic needs for food and shelter are not being met, as exist in many parts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Often, Sub-Saharan host nations do not have the political will to prevent 
further environmental harms because of the economic activity brought to the region by the 
activities of an MNE. The World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 
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concluded that the earth is held in trust for future generations.99  Yet there is not yet a systemic 
strategy for coming to grips with the sustainability challenges cited above. 
 
These development challenges inform the corporate governance debate in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
What is the proper role of the corporation where host nations do not have the regulatory structure 
to require the corporation to engage in economic activity in a manner that reduces harms and 
increases the economic security of the people who are working to generate wealth for the 
company?  What limits can or should be placed on the corporation and what is the appropriate 
vehicle for effective imposition and enforcement of any limits?  What is the obligation of 
international lending agencies in assisting with the development of governance models that 
promote economic and social sustainability? 
 
 
II. A Framework for Thinking about Corporate Governance in South Africa 
  
Conceptually, most if not all jurisdictions have legally constructed the corporation as a separate 
legal personality aimed at the generation of wealth through its economic activities, with perpetual 
existence, the ability to contract and limited liability for investors.  While viewed as largely 
engaged in private activity, the corporation, whether closely or widely held, private or an issuing 
corporation, is the beneficiary of a highly codified regime that enables it to operate in multiple 
jurisdictions.100  There is also special status granted the persons who participate in its activity 
through the corporate form in terms of the limitation of individual liability for corporate actors when 
corporate activity causes harms.101 Yet globally, there is strong normative disagreement as to the 
role and responsibility of the corporation, ranging from a single shareholder-wealth-maximizing 
objective that is the predominant paradigm of Anglo-American systems, to conception of the 
corporation as socially situated and constructed, more prevalent in continental Europe and Japan.  
In parts of Africa, this conception is overlaid with the notion of the corporation’s civic duties.  
Corporate law scholarship is grounded in different normative views of the corporation, which form 
the underpinning of current analysis.  For example, some believe that corporate law involves 
observations about the effects of legislative intervention on the functioning of perfect markets, 
corrected for any outliers.102   Investors are viewed as rational actors, not socially situated 
individuals, with wealth maximization as their sole objective.  Hence corporate law scholarship 
explores the law’s role as enabling and efficiency enhancing measured by returns to 
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shareholders, with all the attendant distributive effects.  Yet the shareholder wealth maximization 
model appears incongruent with South Africa’s commitment to situating the corporation within civil 
society.103  Even Adam Smith recognized that the pursuit of profit could work against the public 
interest of wealth generation for the benefit of society and argued for scrupulous examination of 
any business legislative initiative that could be contrary to the public interest.104  This observation 
appears somewhat lost in the current Anglo-American governance debate. 
 
 
A. Corporate Governance in a Domestic Context 
 
Corporate governance, whether in Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada or elsewhere, involves creating 
the proper incentives for individuals in their management of the corporation, although the entire 
construct of this governance regime depends on what the incentives are aimed at. The 
vulnerability of the corporation’s assets to claims from legal liability serves as a constraint on 
decision-making by corporate managers, even under the strictest shareholder wealth 
maximization conception.  If directors and officers subject the corporation’s assets to legal liability 
through reckless or negligent acts, they may face personal liability for breach of their fiduciary 
duty.  However, corporate affairs in a multi-national operation can be arranged so that this risk is 
greatly reduced. The combination of the limited liability of the corporate form, and the general 
understanding of international law as inapplicable to MNEs’ operations dramatically reduce the 
constraints on their managers in regard to respecting the environment, human, political or social 
rights in their operations outside the “home” country.105  
 
Corporate law statutes assign directors oversight and control of the operations of the corporation.  
Shareholders can exercise episodic voice in corporate affairs, but only indirectly, through the 
election of directors, advisory shareholder resolutions, voting on management’s resolutions and 
super-majority votes on changes to capital structure that affect the existing shareholders.  In 
terms of the limited liability regime, a key feature is that shareholder liability is limited to the 
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shareholder’s total investment.  Managers control the corporation’s activity, but they have no 
general personal liability for harms caused by its activity.106  How we construct the economic 
incentives in the corporate governance system determines the outcomes, in this case, a 
narrowing of the corporate focus to short-term wealth maximization.  
 
The second broad approach to corporate governance is that in acting in the best interest of the 
corporation, directors and officers should take account of the interests of all those with 
investments or interest in the corporation.  While scholars differ on whether this should be a direct 
fiduciary obligation to corporate stakeholders or an obligation to balance multiple interests or 
prejudice, the idea is to take account of these interests.107  In taking into account stakeholder 
interests, the corporation should be concerned with negative externalities from its activities, 
including those that cause social and economic harms.  This approach is also helpful in that it 
seeks to internalize all costs of productive activity, including long term sustainability costs, 
adjustment costs for labour shedding and harms from consumer torts.108 The premise is that if 
these costs were internalized, the corporation would be more likely to engage in decisions that 
foster long term job skills development instead of labour shedding; human rights practices instead 
of harms caused by discrimination; and environmentally sound practices to avoid the costs of 
harm and remediation that would be internalized to the corporation.  The approach also has its 
challenges, one of which is how to ensure that corporate decision makers are accountable, given 
that they could justify any decision based on an expressed concern for the interests of a particular 
group.  While the stakeholder conception of the corporation would formally recognize all those 
with an interest in the corporation, it leaves unresolved the larger issue of whether or not 
corporations should be allowed to determine social and economic policy through their activities.109  
Of course, in the absence of any regulatory activity in a particular policy area, corporations are 
determining social and economic policy in that area through their unregulated activities. 
 
Corporations engage in wealth generating activity because of public laws and policies that act as 
enabling devices in this activity.  Yet corporations also have the ability to contribute to political 
parties and hence to influence the political process regarding not only corporate law, but also 
other laws that touch on their liabilities, such as labour or environmental law.110  Some of the 
current challenges to sovereign nations and protection of domestic human rights and 
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environmental norms are the result of political lobbying and consequent domestic adoption of 
policies of free trade, deregulation and dismantling of particular social safety nets.111  This trend is 
repeated internationally as MNEs exert considerable pressure in the international forum in terms 
of promoting trade, finance and capital markets policies that insulate their activities outside of the 
home state from liability.   
 
 
B. Corporate Governance in the Context of Globalization and MNEs 
 
Globalization poses particular challenges to the ability of domestic governments to enforce 
specific normative standards, particularly where corporations headquartered in the nation state 
have their economic activity elsewhere. It is increasingly evident that domestic law is incapable in 
itself of controlling the activities of MNEs, a concern where exportation of particular production 
activities creates harms in terms of human rights, health and safety or environmental standards. 
Moreover, the ability of domestic jurisdictions to tax corporations to generate revenue necessary 
to provide social services to ameliorate the harms is limited by the multinational nature of the 
corporate activity.112  
 
What will be the long term impact of “regulatory chill” in terms of both the willingness of MNEs to 
situate themselves in jurisdictions with few environmental or labour standards and the inability of 
host or home nations to devise laws that protect their citizens from the harmful effects of 
unregulated environmentally harmful or discriminatory activity?113  MNEs have been implicated in 
nations that engage in repressive human rights policies or police repression in order to engage in 
productive activity.114  MNEs have allegedly engaged in human rights violations, activities harmful 
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to the environment, child labour, anti-unionization activity, slavery and dangerous health and 
safety conditions.115  This has occurred in parts of Africa and elsewhere, particularly where the 
host nation is desperate for the economic activity that MNEs offer.  
 
Unlike developed countries, where there exists a framework for tempering the unchecked 
activities of corporations through employment standards, human rights and environmental law, 
many Sub-Saharan African countries do not have the infrastructure to develop or enforce laws to 
address the multinational enterprise.  Moreover, initiatives such as the OECD corporate 
governance guidelines are aimed primarily at creating legal and enforcement structures in these 
nations for equity capital investors.116 Corporate codes of conduct are aimed at ensuring 
transparency of governance and financial reporting, and securities and credit enforcement 
regimes offer effective remedies for investors. The convergence pressure in respect of these 
property protections is facilitated by the importation of U.S. experts in the design of systems and 
considerable pressure to have transition and developing nations adopt Anglo-American norms 
and legal structures without consideration of the other types of remedial protections that exist as 
a counterbalance in Anglo-American jurisdictions. While these property protections are essential 
to fostering investor confidence and thus healthy capital markets, they ignore the need for a host 
of other public policy measures that are needed to provide the appropriate balance in wealth 
creation and protection of those with interests in the corporation.  That interest might be a direct 
one, in terms of investments made in labour or local infrastructure, or it may be an interest in the 
environmental and social impact of corporate activities on the local community and the 
environment.  The OECD corporate governance guidelines advocate respecting domestic law 
commitments to other stakeholder interests, but are silent on these issues where the domestic 
jurisdiction does not already have a developed notion of the corporation as socially situated.117 
The growth of MNE activity across multiple jurisdictions and international trade law that facilitates 
free trade and limits use of principles such as the national treatment principle has diminished the 
domestic regulatory capability of the nation-state, raising troubling social and distributional 
issues.118  It is important to examine the specifics of the regulatory diminution. 
 
MNEs are organizations which, while created in one state, operate in several states through 
subsidiary corporate entities created in each country of operation, through contractual links in 
supply and delivery chains, and/or through licensing and franchise agreements.  As private 
entities, MNEs are subject to the national law of the states in which they operate, and may also 
have been granted certain rights under treaties between states, rights that can be enforced in the 
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courts of the applicable state. Certain treaties also provide for protection of investor rights against 
state action through binding international arbitration. Arbitration provides a dispute resolution 
mechanism for claims against the state by investors claiming the state regulatory or legislative 
actions harmed their investments. Thus a forum exists for private actors to hold public state 
actors accountable for decisions that harm equity investments. In contrast, however, there is no 
international forum in which these enterprises can be held accountable for their actions in breach 
of fundamental international law and conventions concerning human rights, the environment and 
social/political rights.119  International law assigns this function to the courts of the various states, 
exercising their national jurisdiction over activities of the corporations that originate in or affect 
their territory. 
 
There are two issues that arise when subsidiaries are involved. The first is that a subsidiary is 
provided with its own “legal personality”. Thus if a subsidiary is created to mine asbestos in South 
Africa, then that is the legal entity to which liability will attach in the first instance. If asbestos 
mining causes harm, then nothing automatically attaches liability on to the parent corporation for 
the acts of the subsidiary, irrespective of the ownership structure. Given this situation, the 
incentive on the parent is to leave as few assets in the subsidiary as possible.120  This leaves the 
miners with the unenviable task of establishing direct liability through a claim the parent failed to 
properly supervise the subsidiary or vicarious liability for the acts of one’s subsidiary.121 Thus, 
parent corporations may be encouraged to transfer all of the subsidiaries’ surplus assets to 
themselves in order to limit the loss to the MNE overall. If they are successful in doing so, they 
will have lessened constraints on decisions to breach international norms. 
 
Second, the use of unlimited subsidiaries as the vehicle for corporate activities internationally 
means that directors and officers of controlling parent corporations are not directly liable for the 
actions of the subsidiary even where they are the controlling mind of the subsidiary. The 
construction of domestic liability regimes, judicial reluctance to draw aside the corporate veil and 
the practice of shifting corporate assets from the subsidiary to the parent to shield the assets from 
remedial claims in the host nation, create considerable barriers to MNE accountability for 
international activities.122 
 
There is frequently reluctance of home and/or host governments to take action against MNEs 
because of their importance to the country’s economy or because, as discussed on Part I, they 
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are beneficiaries of the company’s activities.  Hence while a separate legal entity has been 
formed for purposes of economic activity in the host nation, the host nation may be reluctant to 
enact legislation that may protect its citizens during the subsidiary’s value generating activity in 
the host nation. Those who may be harmed by its activities frequently do not have access to 
standards within their own nation or an enforcement mechanism in order to redress or prevent 
harms.123 
  
The beneficiaries of these trends are the MNEs.  The liberalization of labour markets has meant 
that in the home state, the MNE can exert consideration economic pressure to dismantle 
standards and make the home nation “more competitive” in a market in which the MNE has 
generated the competition.  Failure to accede to these demands results in plant and industry 
closures and exportation of the economic activity elsewhere, where the host nation is so anxious 
for jobs and economic activity that it undertakes to allow the corporation to operate relatively 
unfettered. This undermines the effective power of nations to regulate domestic labour law and 
social policy.124  This trend is complicated enormously by the development history discussed in 
Part I and by the consequent inability of the host nation that has agreed to trade liberalization to 
provide some balance to stakeholder interests engaged in corporate value generating activity. 
 
 
C. International Norms versus Corporate “Cultural Sensitivity” 
 
Another issue is what corporations have called the political and cultural sensitivities of the host 
nation.  An example would be nations where women or particular racial groups are not given 
access to employment, or if they are, their compensation reflects highly discriminatory practices.  
Respecting the cultural norms of the host jurisdiction in such a case runs contrary to international 
human rights and is offensive to Canadian and other law regarding equality rights.  The MNE’s 
continued investment in the host nation that supports inequitable employment practices results in 
further dollars being invested to perpetuate gender and race discrimination.  While developed 
nations must be careful not to press for wholesale importation of their normative conceptions of 
human rights or environmental sustainability into Sub-Saharan Africa and other emerging 
economies, it is appropriate to hold those nations to international norms set through democratic 
international efforts.  The socio-cultural differences cannot be used, as they are now, to justify 
discriminatory and repressive labour practices and unaccountable environmental harms. 
International NGO communities have identified this problem for years, yet corporations continue 
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to engage in global activity, relatively unchecked and unscathed by these debates.125  Hence the 
question is whether there ought to be internally generated norms that could potentially 
complement the public policy debates of international comparative law scholars. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of a rich diversity of complex economic, social and political 
situations, hence there is not one prescription or strategy for effective corporate governance nor 
should there be.  Similarly, while the current challenges facing these countries are shaped by 
their history, post-colonial economic controls, the politics of international developments such as 
the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and the complex social, religious, tribal structure, there 
are commonalties.126   This includes long-periods in their development of external control, first 
through colonization, in which many domestic customs and economic activity were suppressed, 
and then through continued economic control, through both heavy interest on debt and through 
ownership structures of economic entreprises.  This history and continued distribution of capital 
shapes not only corporate activity, but can determine state attitudes towards corporate 
governance.   In turn, this can shape the nation’s prospects for economic sustainability, in terms 
of access to education, business and other skills, health care and the infrastructure that can lead 
to development.  While there will be continued convergence pressure if emerging economies are 
to attract global capital, government initiatives must clarify the constraints that the emerging 
nation is willing to impose on corporate actors and determine in whose interest regulatory and 
economic activity is generated. 
 
 
D. Importing Assumptions is Dangerous  
 
In the Anglo-American conception of corporate activity, wealth is generated in part by the creation 
of externalities, those costs that the corporation does not have to bear and which are picked up 
by society in the form of unemployment, social welfare benefits and health care costs.  The 
corporation is rewarded for its creation of externalities because it can shed many real costs 
associated with its activities and report greater profits, in turn paying out greater dividends to 
shareholders and extracting increased personal compensation for officers.  Absent a requirement 
to account for all costs of corporate activity, the cycle continually repeats itself, causing a further 
distribution of wealth in favour of the corporation and its investors.   
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In Africa, these externalized costs are borne by millions of poor workers who act as a source of 
extremely cheap labour extracting already inexpensive resources.  The African people thus lose 
both control over their natural resources and over any wealth they may generate, including the 
ability to ensure that the resources are preserved, sustained and regenerated for the future.  They 
also bear the costs from this exploitation through the social and economic costs of poor wages, 
an inability to properly feed or shelter families, and injury and death on the job.  The framework of 
wealth generation by reliance on externalizing costs imported into Sub-Saharan Africa carries 
with it some inappropriate assumptions.  One glaring example of the outcome of corporate 
externalities in Sub-Saharan Africa are the townships and other conditions of extreme poverty for 
those who migrate to urban centres looking for work.  These conditions are created by the MNEs 
ability to extract concessions in exchange for FDI, resulting in reduced taxes to pay for 
infrastructure and the availability of cheap labour in resource extraction.  Such an approach does 
not allow communities to sustain themselves.  While MNEs interesting in investing in Africa now 
should not have to bear the full costs of historical inequities, arguably neither should the host 
nation or its citizens who are disadvantaged by historical debt repayment obligations.  Until one 
can break the pattern that currently exists, corporate governance reform in Sub-Saharan Africa 
will have little impact. 
 
Amartya Sen has observed that business is both a competitive and a co-operative activity, and 
that societies flourish because of codes of conduct and the recognition of strategic 
interdependencies, involving the practical recognition of the goals of others, of the enterprise and 
of living in a situation of social interdependence.127  Hence, costs and benefits of development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa need to be assessed through a process of collective evaluation on the social 
value of corporate activity.  This requires a determination of to whom the benefits of development 
are accruing and who is bearing the costs.128  Equally important, how can one construct a 
governance system that addresses the current inequitable distribution of wealth and creates the 
basis for more collective benefits that can accrue from successful corporate activity? 
 
 
III. South Africa: Strategies for Enhancing Governance 
 
South Africa has fared better economically than many other Sub-Saharan African Nations.  Of 
global emerging equity portfolios, South Africa has captured about 8%, largely because of the 
stability of its Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).129  In 1998, South Africa had a market 
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capitalization of R170,252 million, with 668 companies listed, and a market capitalization to GDP 
ratio of 131.9%.130 
 
Some of governance challenges faced by South African domestic markets bear a striking 
resemblance to issues faced by other markets globally.  These include:  executive compensation 
that is not appropriately tied to performance and is frequently excessive; a structure and role of 
the board of directors that leads to failure of oversight; the lack of independence of auditors and 
problems with transparency and adequacy of accounting standards; and questions about the 
appropriate role of outside directors in governance of the corporation.  These challenges are 
evident in the recent failures of South African companies, discussed in Part I.  Yet South Africa 
also faces unique challenges in thinking about the advancement of domestic corporate activity 
through effective governance. 
 
Much of South African corporate law is based on the U.K. system, including its company law 
statutes and much of its common law.  Hence governance issues, including the scope of decision 
making by corporate officers, prohibitions on self-dealing and the scope and limits of fiduciary 
obligation are heavily influenced by U.K. jurisprudence that has developed over the last century.  
In this respect, South Africa is similar to Canada, in that Canada’s company law is derived from 
the same sources.  More recently, American corporate common law has impacted on Canada, 
but similarities still exist.  As discussed in Part I, in South Africa longstanding companies’ 
legislation and other statutes, as well as the common law, were supplemented by a Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct in the 1990’s.  Yet unlike the U.K. and Canada, the 
comprehensive corporate law regime is not matched by remedial legislation that tempers 
corporate activity by protecting human rights and enforcing environmental protection.  Where 
such legislation does exist in South Africa, it is unclear that it is effectively enforced such that it 
tempers corporate malfeasance.  Moreover, for the reasons cited in the last Part, the host nation 
may be unwilling or unable to enforce any remedial protections or standards because of the 
urgent need for capital and economic activity in a region. 
 
There are also similarities in the capital structures of South Africa and Canada.  South African 
companies are primarily financed by equity capital.  Domestic corporations are large and 
constitute a sizable proportion of the Gross Domestic Product of South Africa.131  Unlike the U.S., 
in which the operating governance paradigm is one of separation of ownership and control, 
Canada’s governance regime is one in which both publicly traded and privately held corporations 
are frequently closely controlled.  Whereas the primary governance challenge for the U.S. system 
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is to reduce agency costs of managerial self-dealing or shirking to the detriment of the interests of 
investors, the governance challenge in Canada is to reduce the possibility of collusion between 
corporate officers and controlling shareholders (represented also on the board of directors 
through nominee positions) to the detriment of minority investors and other stakeholders.  While 
there has been a large growth in holdings by institutional shareholders in the past decade, there 
are still a large number of corporations that are closely held, even when publicly traded, as is the 
case in South Africa.  In this respect, the governance challenges facing South Africa are 
somewhat akin to those faced in Canada.    
 
The capital structure of South African domestic corporations arose as a result of the sanctions of 
the apartheid era and its devastating economic and social inequities.132  A few individuals, 
families and companies controlled many of the corporations in a series of complex cross-
holdings.  Apartheid also resulted in relatively little foreign investment or ownership, particularly 
as world condemnation of apartheid practices grew.    With the end to apartheid and economic 
boycotts of South Africa, the capital markets began to open to the West, creating some shift in 
holdings.  By 2000, there were 608 companies listed on the main board of the JSE and two-thirds 
of all listed companies had a shareholder with more than 30% shareholding.133  While this 
indicates a continuing high level of concentration of capital, it also indicates that the majority of 
South African companies no longer have legal control vested in a single shareholder.  However, 
the levels of concentration may mean that these individuals or companies still have de facto 
control over governance of the corporation.  Mongalo also observes that of 190 corporations 
listed on the JSE in December 2001 that had a single or small group of shareholders with 50% 
control, the majority were institutional shareholders.134  Hence, he argues that South African 
corporate governance must take account of situations in which corporations are widely held, as 
well as those cases in which they are closely held, if it is to be meaningful in the South African 
context.  In this, he believes that the King II report on corporate governance, discussed below, 
only considered the governance mechanisms required for widely held corporations in its 
promulgation of a revised code of corporate practices and governance. 
 
 
A. King Reports on Corporate Governance  
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Corporate governance in South Africa has focused primarily on listed companies.  Governance 
policy has been shaped by two reports of Committees studying corporate governance in 1994 
and 2002.  The corporate governance principles enunciated by these reports are aimed at 
“affected companies”, a defined term.135  The first committee that studied corporate governance 
in South Africa was established in 1992, following closely on the heels of the Cadbury Committee 
Study in the U.K..136  Dubbed “King I” after its chair, Mervyn King S.C., the King Committee 
issued a report and a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct in 1994.  The JSE subsequently 
enshrined many of the recommendations as part of its listing requirements.137  A further review 
was conducted a decade later, resulting in the King II Report in 2002, including a revised Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct.138  While the Code applies to all companies listed on the JSE, 
banks, financial and insurance entities, and certain public sector enterprises, King II urged other 
companies to give consideration to implementing the provisions of the code as best governance 
practice.139  As with many corporate governance codes globally, the King II Code mandates 
principles, but does not prescribe a particular course of conduct or action.  King II reflects very 
sophisticated thinking about the governance role of the board and implications for multiple 
stakeholders. In some respects, it is ahead of guidelines developed in many developed countries.  
This part examines the substance of recommendations for good governance and then the 
challenges for implementation. 
 
The King II Report found that South Africa might arguably offer investment returns that are 
competitive globally, even when factoring in political, currency and other risks, and that corporate 
governance was an essential component if South Africa is to continue to compete.  It referred to 
the June 2000 survey published by McKinsey & Co., which found that of 200 global institutional 
investors representing US $3 trillion in assets, 84% indicated a willingness to pay a premium on 
investment in well-governed companies over those poorly governed (where they had a 
comparable financial record).140  Hence, King II’s Code is aimed a providing a comprehensive set 
of principles for effective governance. 
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King II sets out seven characteristics of good corporate governance.141  The first is transparency, 
the ease with which investors and others are able to meaningfully assess the financial and 
operational aspects of the company.  The second is independence in terms of the mechanisms in 
place to ensure the avoidance of conflicts and minimizing potential conflicts of interest.  The third 
principle is accountability by corporate decision makers for their decisions and actions.  King II 
recommended that effective mechanisms must exist to allow investors to query and assess the 
actions of the board.  The fourth principle is that the board must act in a manner that is 
accountable to the company, but also act responsively to and with responsibility towards all 
stakeholders.142  The fifth factor is one of corporate discipline; whereby corporate officers adhere 
to standards of behaviour that are widely viewed as correct and proper behaviour.143  Sixth, is 
fairness, in that governance systems and practices must take into account and balance the 
interests of all those with an interest in the corporation and its future.  This principle is more 
progressive than principles enunciated by many developed countries, although as discussed 
below, its implementation faces considerable challenges.  Finally, a well-managed company must 
be aware of and respond to social issues, placing priority on ethical standards of conduct. King II 
observed that good governance means that the company is non-discriminatory, non-exploitative, 
and responsible in respect of human rights and environmental protection. 
 
 
i.  Transparency 
  
King II observed that a report by one institutional investor ranked South Africa among the top five 
of 25 emerging markets in terms of corporate governance, but that it ranked poorly in terms of 
disclosure and transparency.144  King II observed that the minimalist approach to corporate 
governance by a number of domestic companies must change.   
 
King II recommends a number of measures to increase transparency of corporate decisions.  It 
emphasized that directors must have unrestricted access to all company information, records and 
documents, and that the information needs of the board should be well defined and regularly 
monitored.145  There should also be transparency in the recruitment and nomination process for 
directors.  Procedures for appointments should be formal and transparent, and final decisions on 
recruitment of directors made by the board as a whole, with the assistance of a nomination 
                                                 
141 King II at 18.1-18.7. 
142 King II at 18.5. 
143 King II at 18.1. 
144 King II at 15. 
145 King II at 2.1.7. 
 33
committee where appropriate.146 The nominating committee should be comprised entirely of non-
executive directors.  King II also recommends that companies provide full disclosure of director 
remuneration on an individual basis and that compensation should include performance-related 
elements. King II also recommends that membership of the remuneration committee must be 
disclosed in the annual report and that the chair of such committee should attend annual general 
meetings to respond to questions by shareholders.147  This would enhance transparency by 
enabling investors to assess director remuneration and whether it is sufficiently linked to 
performance. 
 
The King II report had an immediate impact.  The JSE reviewed its listing requirements and 
incorporated more rigorous requirements, effective November 2002, for directors in respect of 
their dealings in company shares and disclosure of director remuneration in the company’s 
financial statements.  The revised listing requirements also require the nomination committee of 
public companies to be comprised of only of non-executive directors. 
 
Disclosure must also encompass reporting that is broader than financial performance reporting.  
King II recommended that every company should report at least annually on the nature and 
extent of its social, transformation, ethical, safety, health and environmental management policies 
and practices.148  Disclosure of such information should be governed by the principles of 
reliability, relevance, clarity, comparability, timeliness and verifiability with reference to the Global 
Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines on economic, environmental and social 
performance.149  King II also recommends disclosure as to efforts to reduce workplace accidents 
and injury; the nature and extent of strategies to address and manage the impact of HIV/AIDS;  
best environmental practices; disclosure of human capital development against equity targets. 
 
These recommendations are directly relevant to South Africa’s potential for sustainability.  In 
many developed countries, there are no similar required disclosures, although a number of 
corporations have voluntarily agreed to report on a triple bottom line basis.  The difficulty for 
South Africa, as for voluntary initiatives in Canada, is that absent enforceable standards, there 
may not be sufficient incentive to comply with sustainability goals.  Canadian corporations, even 
those supporting GRI reporting, have vigorously opposed any codification of standards that would 
provide rights and remedies.  South Africa may not fare any better once it tries to move past 
general principles.  Still, the requirement to report on these initiatives is a giant step forward and 
likely to have some positive impact on corporate activity, creating some normative pressure 
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internationally for a “sustainability culture”.  Moreover, reporting and failure to address harms may 
encourage NGOs and citizen groups to press for standards and measures to address harms.   
 
 
ii. Directors’ Duties  
 
The South Africa Companies Act does not codify the fiduciary obligations of directors, however, at 
common law, directors have been found to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company.  
Fiduciary duty is not well defined, and the courts have held that principles of equity underlie 
fiduciary obligation and that the substance of the relationship and not the form must be examined 
to ascertain its nature and extent.150  The Nel Commission investigating the collapse of 
Masterbond Group recommended that the duties of directors be codified in the Companies Act, 
requiring directors to act honestly and in good faith, with such reasonable skill, diligence and 
care, including reasonable inquiry, as a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar 
circumstances, in the best interests of the company.151 
 
King II emphasized that directors’ obligations are to the company, not its shareholders.  It 
expressly rejects the “shareholder dominant theory”, finding that the company is a separate 
persona in law and that the relationship of the company and shareholders is contractual, arising 
out of the articles of association.  It expressly rejected the notion that shareholders are the 
“owners” of the corporation.152  However, it also recognized that shareholders expect return on 
their investment and that this contractual relationship must be respected.  This approach leaves 
some uncertainty as to how directors are to exercise their fiduciary obligations and how they may 
be held accountable.  Express rejection of the “shareholder dominance theory” in favour of best 
interests of the corporate is a very positive aspect of the King II Report. Yet absent either 
statutory standards of conduct under company law and accompanying remedial statutes, and 
effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of those standards, the only accountability 
mechanism is a reversion back to shareholder limited control mechanisms of exit and replacing 
directors at annual general meetings.  King II leaves this critically important question unanswered. 
 
Notwithstanding this unresolved issue, King II contains many important substantive governance 
recommendations.  King II found that directors have an obligation to ensure that there are 
effective systems of internal control on accounting practices and standards, supported by 
reasonable, prudent and consistent judgment.  It recommends that non-executive directors 
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should have skills, experience and credibility to bring independent judgment to bear on issues of 
strategy, performance, resources, transformation, diversity and employment equity and standards 
of conduct and evaluation of performance.153  King II called for an affirmation by directors that 
they accept responsibility for the preparation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP.  
Nomination committees should carefully check to ensure that potential nominees are qualified to 
be director, within the meaning of JSE guidelines.  King II expressly calls for training for new 
directors with no or limited board experience.  This should include a formal orientation 
programme to familiarize the director with the company’s operations, senior managers and the 
business environment.  Such training is also essential to make directors appreciate the scope of 
their fiduciary obligations and the potential for personal liability where these obligations are not 
fulfilled. 
 
As with many countries, there has been a problem with excessive executive compensation in 
South Africa, and insufficient connection between performance and compensation.154  Both 
director and officer compensation should be tied to performance, but in a manner that rewards 
long term sustainable development, not short term returns. The transparency measures 
discussed above may create some normative pressure on corporate boards for their decisions 
relating to executive compensation. 
 
 
 
 
iii. Board Composition and Independence 
 
A survey of 73 major South African companies in 2002 found that corporate boards ranged from 5 
to 30 directors, with the average board size being 12 directors.155  For South African banks, the 
average board size is 19 directors.156  The size of the board and the independence of directors 
can have a direct bearing on effective governance. 
 
The revised Code adopted by the JSE after King II emphasizes that corporations need an 
effective board as the focal point of the corporate governance system.  The corporate board must 
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retain full and effective control over the company and monitor management in its implementation 
of board strategies.157  The board has an obligation to ensure that the company has complied 
with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of business practice, and that it communicates with 
shareholders and other stakeholders in a timely and transparent manner.158  King II also 
reinforces the notion that the board has a responsibility to engage in strategic planning and risk 
assessment for the company.  In Canada, risk assessment includes both upside and downside 
risks to the company, an idea that is echoed in King II’s suggestion that the board should be 
monitoring key performance indicators, with particular attention to technology and systems.  The 
King II report goes further than Canadian governance recommendations, however, in the sense 
of recommending that it is important that boards identify and monitor the non-financial aspects 
relevant to the business of the company.159 
 
King II calls for a balance between executive and non-executive directors, preferring that a 
majority of directors be independent of management.  Its focus here is protection of minority 
investors.160  King II also advocates that boards analyze their existing composition to determine 
whether their size, diversity and demographic composition ensure that they are as effective as 
possible.  The revised Code also required a separation of the board chair and the CEO, in order 
to ensure a balance of power and authority.  The chairperson should preferably be an 
independent non-executive directive.161 
 
King II expanded on the discussion of independence from its first report.  King II defines directors 
as executive, non-executive, independent and shadow directors.162  Executive directors are 
corporate officers involved in operating the business or in full-time employment of the company or 
its subsidiary.  Non-executive directors are not involved in daily management of the business, but 
can be interested in the sense of being officers of the holding company. Independent directors 
are both non-executive and have no other relationship with the company other than the 
directorship.  The independent director is not a shareholder nominee, does not have familial ties, 
is not a professional advisor to the company, has no significant contractual relationship with the 
company and is free from any business or other relationship that could be seen to materially 
affect the director’s capacity to act in an independent manner.163  A “shadow” director is 
considered to be a person (frequently a controlling shareholder) who is able to influence the 
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activities of the corporation and decisions of the board, and whose directions or instructions 
determine the company’s decisions and actions.  King II recommended that shadow directors 
should be discouraged.164 
 
King II also recommends staggered terms for boards, formal briefings on developments in the 
law, and levels of remuneration that are sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors.165  It 
called for regular board meetings, efficient and timely methods for informing and briefing 
members, and full access by directors to management.  There should be regular review of 
processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of the company’s internal systems of 
control.166  King II advocated retention of the single board structure as appropriate to South 
Africa, primarily so that all directors would have the same information and hence engage in better 
decision making.   
 
King II emphasized that the board’s role is one of oversight, its guidelines closely aligning with the 
non-mandatory guidelines developed in Canada.  Governance in both countries suggests that the 
board must give strategic direction to the company, must appoint the CEO, ensure that an 
effective succession planning strategy is in place, and that there is a mechanism to evaluate the 
performance of both board chair and the CEO.  King II also recommends that companies adopt a 
charter setting out board responsibilities, and that the charter should be disclosed in the 
company’s annual report.  Boards must develop codes of conduct addressing conflicts of interest.  
It also recommends that boards define levels of materiality, in terms of defining what powers are 
for the board to retain and what is more appropriately delegated to officers, with the board 
monitoring the exercise of that power. 
 
The Myburgh Commission investigating governance of South African banks echoed many of 
these recommendations.  It recommended that banks have smaller boards, that there be limits on 
the number of executive directors, and that the majority of directors should be independent 
directors.167  It observed that the independence of directors must be de facto as well as de jure, 
so that the director can bring impartiality, objectivity, fairness and flexibility to the exercise of 
judgment, and have the courage to challenge management’s current or projected future plans 
where they consider them not to be in the company’s best interests.168  Myburgh suggested that 
non-executive directors should meet at least twice annually without the executives.169  In South 
Africa, there are express regulations on the competency levels required of bank directors, aimed 
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at ensuring that directors have effective risk management skills.170  As with King II, the Myburgh 
Commission adopted a fulsome approach to directors’ duties, that they must have the necessary 
skill and experience to engage in oversight of strategy, resources, transformation, diversity and 
employment equity, standards of conduct and evaluation of performance.171  There should be 
clearly defined authority and roles for all board committees, including ongoing review of their 
mandate and effectiveness.  The performance of both the board as a whole and the directors 
individually should be reviewed at least annually. 
 
King II specifies that the Board should regularly review processes and procedures to ensure the 
effectiveness of its internal control systems, in order that both the accuracy of financial reporting 
and its decision-making capability are maintained.  There should also be an established 
procedure whereby directors can seek independent professional advice, if necessary, at the 
company’s expense.  The board should meet regularly, at least quarterly, and there should be 
annual disclosure of the frequency of meetings and directors’ attendance in the Annual Report.  
The Annual Report should also include a statement that the directors accept responsibility to 
prepare the financial statements and that they fairly present the state of affairs of the company; 
that the auditors are responsible for reporting on the financial statements; that adequate 
accounting records have been maintained and that there is an effective system of internal control 
and risk management; that appropriate accounting policies have consistently been used and that 
any departure is disclosed, explained and quantified.  Directors should also attest that there is no 
reason to believe the business will not be a going concern in the year ahead, or provide an 
explanation of any reasons otherwise. The Annual Report should also disclose which directors 
are executive, non-executive and independent, so that investors and others can assess genuine 
independence. Finally, the Annual Report should confirm that the Code of Corporate Practices 
and Conduct has been adhered to, and report any instances where it has not. 
 
King II also advocates a higher level of shareholder activism and suggests that the board has a 
role to play in encouraging investors to be actively engaged, through annual shareholder 
meetings, fulsome explanation of proposals and open and effective communication with 
investors.  Interestingly, this is a departure from much of the Anglo-American approach, in which 
investor activism is discouraged; the view being that shareholders can exit if dissatisfied with the 
general direction of the corporation.172 
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Successful implementation of all these board practices would seriously reduce the incidence of 
corporate failures in South Africa.  As noted in Part I, almost all the recent failures involved a 
weak and non-independent board as a contributing factor to the collapse. Strong, independent 
and dynamic boards are a critical component of corporate governance. 
 
 
iv.  Auditing and Accounting 
 
Another aspect of recent corporate failures has been problems with a critical gatekeeping 
function, the internal and external audit processes.  The corporate board is accountable for risk 
management and effective systems of internal control, including ongoing processes for 
identifying, evaluating and managing significant risks.173 Companies should have an effective 
internal audit function that provides independent, objective assurance that the management 
processes are adequate to identify and monitor significant risks; provide confirmation of the 
effective operation of internal controls; credible processes for feedback on risk management;  and 
objective confirmation that the board is receiving reliable and accurate information.174  King II 
recommends a separate audit committee that has a majority of independent non-executive 
directors with the majority being financially literate.175  An independent non-executive director who 
is not board chair should chair the audit committee.  The audit committee should have a written 
terms of reference for membership, duties and authority. 
 
The focus on audit independence and financial reporting arises in part out of several corporate 
scandals in South Africa that are resonant with scandals in developed countries.  The 
Masterbond Group financial collapse highlighted problems of corporate dishonesty and investor 
vulnerability.  The Nel Commission investigating Masterbond Group and its affiliated companies 
found that inefficiency, lack of professional honesty, integrity and independence of corporate 
auditors resulting in staggering investor losses.176  The Commission found that accounting 
policies had been altered to change losses to profits without disclosure of the changes; that there 
was falsifying of financial statements, backdating of auditor reports and other malpractice.  More 
than 90% of money borrowed on short term was used within associated companies for highly 
speculative projects, degenerating into a Ponzi scheme.177  The Masterbond scandal occurred in 
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the mid-1990’s.  At the time, its occurrence was in part attributed to the fact that South Africa did 
not have as strong a governance climate as the United States.  In the pre-Enron and WorldCom 
era, developed countries expressed some arrogance at their superior governance systems.  
Ultimately, the U.S. governance system revealed the same kinds of audit and accounting 
deficiencies, exacerbated by inappropriate incentives for corporate officers.  The Nel 
Commission’s investigation into the Masterbond Group revealed serious deficiencies in the South 
African supervisory system and those sections of the Companies Act that were designed to 
protect investors.  It found that the rights granted the investors were more illusory than real.178 
 
Auditors and accountants are financial gatekeepers, particularly in respect of the accountability of 
issuing corporations.  South Africa introduced draft legislation on the accountancy profession, to 
enhance standards of auditing and accounting and to establish a Representative Council of 
Accountants, a Regulatory Board for Auditors and an independent standard-setting board for 
ethics.179  However, the Nel Commission reported that the draft legislation had failed to deal with 
the need for independent regulation, failed to address increasing public distrust in the auditing 
profession by the public and observe that the draft legislation amounted to no more than window 
dressing.180  The Commission also recommended that significant interest groups should be 
allowed to appoint an auditor, including debenture holders, employees and their trade unions. It 
found that the debenture holders and bond investors in the failed Masterbond case would not 
have lost millions had an auditor acting on their behalf been able to access the audit files of the 
main auditor of the entity.181 
 
A Ministerial Panel on Review of the Draft Legislation on the accountancy profession reported in 
September 2003.182 It recommended that the legislation require that auditors comprise only a 
minority of members on the board of the regulatory body controlling the profession.  It found that 
the disciplinary arm of the regulatory body was a particular concern and recommended that a 
retired Judge or senior counsel chair it and that the legislation should provide for the enhanced 
investigatory powers.  The Panel also recommended that auditors should be statutorily obligated 
to report to the regulatory body any false representations or material non-disclosures by 
executive management, and the regulatory body should be empowered to disclose such 
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information to relevant parties if it considers it in the public interest.183  However, the Panel 
rejected the notion of statutorily limiting non-audit services as proposed in the draft legislation.  
Rather, it would leave the nature and extent of such services to pre-approval of the audit 
committee.184  The Panel also rejected the idea of mandatory rotation of auditors, concluding that 
international experience indicates that this does not achieve the objective of independence and 
that there is no empirical data to suggest that a lengthy auditor/client relationship necessarily 
leads to compromise of independence. This recommendation goes in the opposite direction of 
current audit and accounting reform in the U.S., although such restrictions have not yet been 
imposed on Canadian auditors on the theory that Canada has a principles-based accounting 
system as opposed to the U.S. rules-based system that has caused such serious failures.  The 
Panel also cited the limited skills and resource base in South Africa as not making such rotation 
practicable.185   It called for enhanced sanctions for negligent auditors.186  Significantly, the Panel 
recommended that the requirement of the audit committee be enshrined in legislation and that the 
membership be restricted to independent non-executive directors.187 
 
 
B.     King II and the Stakeholder Debate 
 
As discussed in Part II, although there are numerous conceptions of corporate governance, the 
two principal approaches are the shareholder wealth maximization model and the stakeholder 
model.  The first seeks to maximize either short term or long term investor returns, and while 
long-term investment return can frequently align with broader social and economic goals of a 
country, directors and officers are ultimately accountable only to shareholders.  The stakeholder 
model also enjoys a range of approaches, from corporate directors and officers having to 
consider the interests of multiple stakeholders such as creditors, employees and consumers in 
acting in the best interests of the corporation, to a more direct fiduciary obligation to the 
stakeholders for their decisions and actions. 
 
The King I Report in 1994 advocated an integrated approach to good governance in the interests 
of a wide range of stakeholders, having regard for the principles of good financial, social, ethical 
and environmental practices.  It concluded that companies can no longer act independently from 
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the societies in which they operate.  However, the King II Report softens this approach.  King II 
makes a distinction between accountability, where one is called on to render an account, and 
responsibility, where one is liable to be called to account.  King II specifies: 
 
  The stakeholder concept of being accountable to all legitimate stakeholders 
must be rejected for the simple reason that to ask boards to be accountable to 
everyone would result in their being accountable to no one.  The modern 
approach is for a board to identify the company’s stakeholders, including its 
shareowners, and to agree on policies as to how the relationship with those 
stakeholders should be advanced and maintained in the interests of the 
company.188 
 
Hence King II expressly rejects having corporate directors be accountable to all stakeholders on 
the premise that they would then be accountable to no one.189  The difficulty with this conclusion 
is that King II offers no accountability alternative, leaving shareholder remedies as the default 
accountability mechanism.   Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that even under the shareholder 
wealth maximization model, corporate officers are accountable to a multiple investors with 
different investment priorities, timelines and risk capacity, and this has not posed a problem for 
determining the scope of fiduciary obligations to act to maximize their collective interests.   
 
Even though King II enshrined some principles regarding sustainability and integrated 
sustainability reporting, the governance objectives, including sustainability, appear to be aimed at 
maximizing shareholder wealth.  It is here that incoherence in various aspects of King II arise.  
King II emphasized that entrepreneurship and enterprise are what drive emerging economies, 
and hence the challenge for governance is to seek the appropriate balance between enterprise 
performance and constraints on corporate activity.190  The mechanism of who will be able to hold 
corporate officers accountable to this standard is unclear.  
 
However, even with the softening of its position on stakeholder accountability, it is this set of 
recommendations that may distinguish South African corporate governance from that of the 
Anglo-American approach.  King II recommended a move to triple-bottom line reporting, in which 
companies disclose not only their financial performance, but their performance on social, health, 
ethical and environmental practices.  It recommended that the board of directors should define its 
stakeholder groups and direct its governance and reporting to meet their concerns.  Stakeholders 
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are defined broadly to include workers, trade unions, consumers, suppliers and the community. 
King II also recommended that companies should engage their stakeholders in determining the 
company’s standards of ethical behaviour, and then demonstrate their commitment by codifying 
their ethics.  There should also be transparency in disclosure of compliance with the code of 
ethics, measured against defined criteria that would include a statement by the board as to the 
extent that directors believe the ethical standards are being met.  It also recommended 
consideration of transformation challenges such as development of human capital and black 
economic empowerment.  King II’s revised Code also specifies that the board should ensure that 
it receives relevant non-financial information going beyond the financial performance of the 
company, and should look at other qualitative performance factors that involve broader 
stakeholder interests.191  These measures, if fully engaged, would advance corporate governance 
well beyond Anglo-American norms and truly situate the company in civil society.  However, the 
enforcement mechanisms need to be clarified if the measures are to be truly effective.  
 
One of the stakeholder interests identified by King II is diversity in employment, particularly for 
women and black people. In South Africa there has been considerable gender and race 
discrimination, with black women historically doubly disadvantaged.  The South African 
Employment Equity Act has enabled some black people to gain access to jobs, but it has not yet 
been effective on a broad basis.192  Employment equity is aimed at rectifying the social and 
economic effects of historical discrimination that acted as barriers to millions accessing particular 
occupations.  Enforcement of this kind of remedial legislation is a critical component of effective 
governance. 
 
While black empowerment has created a class of successful individuals from previously 
disadvantaged communities, it has not addressed in any meaningful way the vast majority of 
black people in South Africa.193  As a result, there needs to be a more fulsome strategy for 
achieving basic economic and social security, and corporations that are extracting considerable 
wealth from the country should play a role in advancing these changes.  King II recommended 
that black economic empowerment should be aimed at redressing the continued unequal 
distribution of ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial and economic 
resources by ensuring broader participation in the formal economy.194  The King II Report 
observed that this is the only viable strategy for making sustained inroads in alleviating poverty 
and illiteracy. 
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In respect of corporate governance, employment equity has resulted in a slightly increased 
number of black men on corporate boards, although the number of women continues to be very 
small.  The King II Report recommended that companies proactively create the conditions and 
opportunities that will allow previously disadvantaged individuals equal opportunity to reach 
executive levels in companies. In order to facilitate access, including for women, King II 
recommended structural initiatives that will create real access. Scholar Lynne Dallas has written 
extensively on the need for Board diversity as an effective corporate governance mechanism, 
bringing diverse inputs into decision making and acting as a bridge between the board and the 
community.195 
 
Mongalo has observed that the King II report is modelled after international governance models 
aimed at reducing agency costs arising due to the separation of ownership and control, hence its 
focus on the role of non-executive directors, audit committees and the role of shareholders in 
holding managers accountable for their decision making.196  He observes that monitoring the 
conduct of directors and officers has become a critical issue in South Africa because of the 
importance of companies to the economic and social well being of the country.197  Hence, he 
suggests that it is inconceivable to ignore the manner in which companies are governed and the 
legal and other control on managerial power.  In this, the stakeholder debate becomes a critical 
factor. 
 
 
C. Including African Value Systems in Governance Strategies 
 
King II emphasized the need to create a governance system that recognizes the African value 
system.  That system emphasizes the collective good over individual realization.198  It recognizes 
principles of mutual interdependence and the inclination towards consensus rather than 
dissension.  Co-existence with others is highly valued and ubuntu, the spirit of humanity, is key.  
The essence of ubuntu is that you can be respected only because of your cordial co-existence 
with others.199  King II noted that this is a value system that has an inherent trust and belief in the 
fairness of human beings.  Finally, one must recognize the hierarchical nature of political 
structure and philosophy in South Africa, yet one based on a system of broad consultation and 
consideration of interests at all levels as “practiced by the chiefs since time immemorial”.200  King 
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II observed that this should form the basis of modern labour relations and people management 
practice.  Finally, King II observed that the perpetual optimism in South Africa is due to strong 
belief in the existence of an omniscient presence.  Given this value system, King II defines 
corporate governance as leadership that will allow companies to compete effectively in the global 
economy and create jobs; that will act honesty and with integrity; that will address legitimate 
social concerns relating to the company’s activities and provide leadership that is transparent and 
accountable.201 
 
Opio has observed that there is an Africa phenomenology of work, life and relationships, 
suggesting that African business requires more that the minimalist profit-maximization business 
ethic of the West.202  He observes that the Western approach divorces the business enterprise 
from the human person in his or her context.  Rather, a business paradigm in Africa must achieve 
a dynamic balance between the integrity of business, which includes efficiency, and 
competitiveness, and integrity in business.203  In his view, competitiveness also needs a broader 
definition, one that encompasses freedom, fairness and equal opportunities for all; strategic vision 
concerning the nature of both local and global markets; and a commitment to the needs of society 
at large.204   Opio observes that while many of the business scandals in Africa mirror practices in 
the West, a challenge is that much fraud in Africa is viewed as normal and perhaps even 
necessary compensation for the expansion of the free-enterprise system.205  He observes that 
these practices, such as fraud in the banking and telecommunications sectors in Nigeria are 
sanctioned by a quasi-legal system of managers.206  Moreover, because of the strong traditions of 
family, tribe and community, African managers may place the interests of family members or 
tribes people before that of the enterprise, regardless of their skills or suitability.  The African 
sense of time, where time is a composition of events, and means that there is a danger in the lack 
of balance between the procedure of project planning and the execution of the plan.207  Hence, 
Opio argues for a vision of business and ethics that integrates business imperatives with human 
values, those of life, physical and mental health, happiness, the community and the 
environment.208 
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Opio argues that economic development in Africa must be built on values of caring, in order to 
narrow the unjust gap between the few rich and the large number of poor people who live in sub-
human conditions.209  He suggests that Africa will not ever be economically sustainable until 
African leaders break from their dependence on financial aid and development policies designed 
elsewhere, rather, Africa development must have its own unique set of values.210  Resources are 
bridges rather than ends in themselves and hence an African vision of economic relations 
includes pro-existing, sharing resources, viewing possessions in the context of relationship and 
the faith of human interconnection that allows people to give abundantly from what very little they 
possess.211  While he notes that Africa cannot act in isolation and must respond to competitive 
global markets, it needs enough distance to develop policies to promote the values of the people,  
and only then will it de-colonize itself.  Opio argues that current U.S. versions of partnership are 
premised on opportunity windows for U.S. companies and as long as that is the only focus, there 
is no opportunity for partnership, growth and meaningful cooperation.212  Opio suggests that the 
partnership that development agencies need in Africa must be based on the following factors: a 
real shift in attitude; respect for humanity; that African nations should not acquiesce in the 
monetary benefits they receive from donour agencies; being explicit and respecting each others’ 
values; “allies on different terrain” with the same objectives; transparency of interest so that 
common ground can be found where interests diverge; clear contractual standards; and equality 
of capacity. 
 
For the Canadian observer, this Afro-centric approach to corporate governance is very different 
than the Anglo-American system that recognizes or rewards few of these values.  Investors and 
creditors are viewed as self-interested actors and models of governance are designed to temper 
the inevitable self-dealing or shirking that arises from this self-interest.  African notions of 
collective good over self-realization could alter drastically the way in which corporate activity is 
conducted and its success measured.  Given the incredible challenges of population growth, 
poverty and health issues, the notion of co-existence encapsulated by ubuntu, may present the 
only realistic way of developing in South Africa.  Yet for all the reasons discussed above, the 
counter pressures of global capital and the imbalance in power and wealth may fail to 
acknowledge this unique paradigm for thinking about governance. 
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IV Looking Forward 
 
The generation of wealth through corporate activity must take account of whether or not it 
advances the social, political and economic welfare of South African people.  In determining the 
scope and reach of corporate activity, what appropriately belongs to citizens and their state and 
what decision making power accrues to the MNE by virtue of its size?  Can domestically 
registered corporations compete globally, if they do not conform to the largely Anglo-American 
single profit motive conception of the corporation?  Is there a happy median or is accumulation of 
wealth incompatible with social justice? 
 
There has been some debate as to whether the King II report provides strong enough 
recommendations and hence creates the appropriate deterrent effect to corporate misconduct.  
The South African Department of Trade and Industry has questioned the voluntary compliance 
nature of the Report and whether effective governance measures will be implemented and 
sustained absent some statutory enforcement mechanism.213  Naidoo has observed that new 
companies legislation, aimed to be in place in 2006, is likely to contain harsher penalties for 
governance transgressions.214  She observes that while one of the recommendations in King II 
was that a register should be kept of directors who have been found guilty of corporate 
governance transgressions, to be in place by mid-2004; that unless a register is linked to an 
absolute legal prohibition on directors to act again as directors, it is likely to be ineffectual in 
reducing such behaviour.215  
 
The King II recommendations on reporting annually on the ethical, social, health, safety and 
environmental practices are important, but unlikely to be effective absent serious commitment to 
this by legislators.  This may require a commitment that is greater that reporting.  A requirement 
that the company meet either its own declared goals or specified standards set by the democratic 
process, which would give real meaning to sustainability objectives.  To date, legislators have not 
had the political will to link the corporation’s ability to extract resources and hence wealth to a 
requirement to achieve black empowerment, gender equality and environmental and economic 
sustainability. 
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Even where companies settle actions for harms caused by their activities, there appear to be 
inadequate enforcement mechanisms. Naidoo uses as an example the harms caused by 
asbestos by mining enterprise Cape plc.216  Under South African legislation, Cape was liable for 
rehabilitation costs of land contaminated by its operations.  This liability was eliminated by the 
Government in exchange for the company paying millions to the 7,500 former employees and 
people living in the vicinity of its operation for asbestos-related illness.  The government had 
concluded that its priority was compensation for those harmed and that remediation would likely 
have caused the bankruptcy of the company.  However, Cape failed to make the first 
compensation payments and in 2002, the applicants had to pursue legal action to get the 
company to pay.  Those harmed continue to die as the litigation moves through the legal 
process.217  Hence while settlements can reduce litigation costs and direct resources to those 
harmed by corporate occupational and environmental harm, they will be ineffectual absent 
mechanisms to ensure speedy compliance,   
 
Capital is unlikely to flow into South Africa in greater amounts in the absence of effective 
measures to stem business corruption.218  The South African government has been working with 
the United Nations on elimination of all forms of corruption, including business corruption.219 A UN 
Report found that 63% of South African business believes that corruption has become a serious 
issue in business, although only 12% stated that they had refrained from making a major 
investment because of corruption.220 While the Report concluded that South Africa has a 
comprehensive and practical legislative framework in place with appropriate whistle blower 
protection, there are serious weaknesses in the capacity and will to enforce the legislation.221 The 
OECD has argued that bribery undermines good governance and its development of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (adopted in the U.S. in 1999) will allow companies to be prosecuted for bribery in 
both the home and host nations.222 
 
Corporate governance in South Africa and all of Sub-Saharan Africa must engage social, 
environmental and economic issues.  It must tackle the incredible environmental and ecological 
challenges as a high priority.  It must directly engage and begin to eradicate the extreme poverty 
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and poor living standards of the vast majority of people.  Development of resources must look to 
how it sustains and improves the lives of those in the country, and where this conflicts with the 
priorities of those exporting the value generated, there may be need for a new paradigm in terms 
of defining rights to profits generated by the resources and people of this region.  While flight of 
capital is always the risk when considering a reconception of the role of companies, investors will 
respond if they receive transparency and certainty in terms of their investments and understand 
the real costs of particular economic activity.  One proposed solution is socially responsible 
investing. 
 
 
A. Socially Responsible Investing in South Africa 
 
In 2004, the JSE launched the Socially Responsible Investment Index (SRI Index), following suit 
to the Dow Jones Sustainable Group Index and the FTSE4Good index.223  The JSE launched the 
SRI Index as a means of identifying those companies listed on the JSE that integrate principles of 
SRI and sustainability into their business activities.224  The Dow Jones Sustainable Group Index 
outperformed its regular world index 15.8% compared with 12.5% from 1997-2002, and JSE has 
followed suit in an effort to simultaneously capture part of the market and to facilitate investment 
in such companies.225  The JSE has publicly committed to rewarding companies for conducting 
business in a socially responsible way, and the SRI Index will measure performance of 
companies in relation to the triple bottom line. This includes fostering improved stakeholder 
relations, promoting the Financial Services Charter, commitment to ethical and good corporate 
governance practices, and ongoing focus on safety, health and environmental issues.226  Prior to 
this initiative, the amount invested in SRIs in South Africa has been roughly 1.5% of total assets 
under management, compared with 13% in the United States.227 
 
Companies listed on the JSE SRI Index must report on environmental, economic and social 
sustainability.228  This includes strategies to measure and monitor environmental impacts and the 
implementation of systems that ensure that resources are used in a sustainable manner.  
Economic sustainability objectives include decision-making that balances short term profits with 
strategies aimed at long-term growth.  Social sustainability is a recognition that companies are 
required to develop and maintain positive relationships with a wide set of stakeholders, not only 
                                                 
223 JSE Annual Report, 2003, at 14. Http://www.jse.co.za. The JSE received funding of R5 million from the 
Financial Deepening Challenge Fund, operated by the British government. 
224 JSE SRI Index, Background and Selection Criteria, 6 October, 2003, http://www.jse.co.za.  
225 Http://www.socialfunds.com, accessed November 200; http://www.ethicsa.org.  
226 JSE Annual Report, supra, note 216 at 14-15. 
227 Ibid. at 18, 25. 
228 JSE SRI Index, Background and Selection Criteria, supra, note 217 at 3. 
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shareholders.229  The JSE specifies that “companies need to demonstrate core business 
strategies that are linked to internal management systems and key performance indicators aimed 
at promoting the social upliftment, development and poverty reduction of its staff and the 
communities in which it operates”.230  This includes a focus on employment equity, black 
empowerment, fair labour practices, employee health and safety, development of human capital 
and managing the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the companies activities.231  The Plan is 
to measure policy and strategy, management systems and performance and quality of reporting, 
having regard to standards set by internationally, such as the Global Reporting Initiative 
Sustainability Guidelines, 2002;  the UN Declaration of Human Rights; the UN Global Compact, 
1999; the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES);  Social Accountability 
8000, 2001 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).232 
 
The Social Venture Network has advocated principles of corporate social responsibility, including: 
ethical dealing with stakeholders; transparency and accountability to stakeholders; governance 
that seeks to balance conscientious management of resources with the interests of stakeholders; 
the objective of long-term growth and shareholder value; employment practices that support 
diversity, empowerment, fair labour practices, and a harassment free and family friendly work 
environment; fair and honest business dealings and quality products; an open, honest and 
transparent relationship with the community and environmental protection.233   
 
With the launch of the JSE SRI Index, there may be synergies in creating long-term shareholder 
wealth maximization and engaging in socially responsible behaviour, as the latter may produce 
value for shareholders in the long term from reduced liabilities, better consumer goodwill and 
fewer environmental remediation costs. SRI funds utilize particular social and economic 
benchmarks as signs of effective governance.  In some cases, they have policy analysts sitting 
on the trading floor with the financial experts, making decisions on ethical investments against 
criteria of environmental compliance, compliance with labour, employment and human rights 
standards and local securities law, as measures of effective stewardship of corporations and 
                                                 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. at 5. The JSE is also committed to meeting SRI goals in-house, with HIV/AIDs anti-discrimination 
policies, training and counselling; employment diversity (50% of its employees are black and 56% are 
female); and training and education in accounting for disadvantaged students. It has also moved to more 
transparency in reporting board activities, including attendance records of board members, disclosure of 
risk management processes, and ensuring that non-executive directors are the majority on key committee. 
While it is difficult to measure these initiatives, the high profile commitment given by the JSE to these 
initiatives are likely to have its own positive normative effect in terms of companies dealing with the SRI 
Index, Annual Report, supra, note 226 at 28-36. 
233 Social Venture Network, http://www.svn.org.  
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hence long term value maximization potential.234  In the U.S. alone, it is estimated that SRI funds 
hold $2 trillion in assets.235  Those advocating SRI and its ethical screening view SRI as the 
primary vehicle through which to achieve corporate social responsibility, by ultimately positively 
influencing stock prices.  The premise is that shareholders will simultaneously profit and through 
their investments promote social objectives, the notion of doing well financially by “doing social 
good”. These are important developments, because they link effective stewardship of the 
corporation with norms such as long-term sustainability and human rights that arguably can be 
broadly supported as norms that we as a society want to support.  It also indicates that there is a 
market for SRI funds, in terms of investor preferences.  There are, however, a number of critiques 
regarding the efficacy of SRI.  There are problems of transparency in terms of the information 
base on which these decisions are being made and different conceptions of what it means to be 
in compliance with such norms.236    
 
Scholars have also challenged the notion that SRI means that investors will “do well by doing 
good”.  Knoll tracks SRI to turn of the century Quaker and other Christian initiatives screening 
investment for “sin” related activities, the shift through the 1960’s to avoiding investment in war 
related activities, the 1980’s in respect of screening for investment in the then repressive regime 
in South Africa to modern day screening which primarily screens for tobacco.237  Knoll suggests 
that whether or not ethical screening has a direct impact on targeted firms in terms of investors 
improving society by disciplining unethical corporations depends on the steepness of the demand 
curve for the corporation’s securities.  He argues that there is a lack of empirical evidence that it 
has a substantial impact on targeted firms’ stock price and thus on their activities.238 
 
                                                 
234 Sarra, supra, note 100. 
235 Report on Socially Responsible Investing,  http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/2001-
trends.htm. Cynthia Williams reports that by 1999, 9% of  all assets under management in the U.S. were in 
screened funds.  Cynthia Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1197.  
236 Sarra, supra, note 100. 
237 Michael Knoll, “Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying 
Socially Responsible Investment” (2002) 57 Bus. Law 681 at 695. See also, the Social Investment Forum, 
as of 2001, http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/2001-trends.htm, (last accessed May 2002). 
He examines the claim that SRI is at least as profitable and prudent an investment strategy and hence not 
more risky than strategies without a socially conscious component. In respect of this claim, he suggests that 
it may be true where markets are efficient, although this does not indicate that all SRI programs are 
costless, referring to situations where market prices accurately reflect available information and prices are 
unbiased predictors of future prices. He also observes that one must adjust for risk and that the screened 
portfolio must produce a higher return that an unscreened one in order to compensate for the added risk of 
not having a fully diversified portfolio.  Knoll argues that where markets are inefficient, there is a lack of 
empirical support for these claims; ibid. 694, 698. 
238 Although in cases such as South Africa, he concedes that there was a correlation, but suggests that this is 
quite different from causation, i.e. causing South Africa to end its apartheid practices. Ibid. at 710. 
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According to the Social Investment Forum, as of 2001, 96% of all screened assets screened for 
tobacco, whereas less than 50% screen for human rights or labour standards.239  This indicates 
that there are different conceptions of what it means to socially screen.  Investors may or may not 
be aware of the scope of the screens that their funds utilize.  While a screen may be avoiding 
investment in one type of activity, it may be directing additional investment dollars to firms that 
engage in repressive labour or human rights practices.  Since many of the social screening 
agencies sell the screening as a commodity, there is little transparency in the scope of the 
screening and in the weights given to particular corporate conduct.240 
 
There are also challenges unique to South Africa as an emerging economy.  The African Institute 
of Corporate Citizenship has reported that many investors were “burned by the empowerment 
crash” of the late 1990’s and are now reluctant to invest in empowerment equity.241  It notes that 
the Black Empowerment Commission is advocating 10% of all assets under management, 
including those of government employees, be allocated towards areas of national priority via 
SRIs.242  The Institute argues that if enacted, this will have serious implications for SRI in South 
Africa because many funds are opposed to prescriptive allocation of assets.243  Instead, it 
recommends the approach of pension fund regulation, which requires trustees to disclose the 
extent to which, if any, social, environmental, ethical and in some cases labour issues are 
considered in making investment decisions.  Its view is that disclosure will be the driver in 
changing investment practices to more socially responsible behaviour.  The Institute suggests 
that in order for South Africa’s SRI sector to advance, the term SRI needs to be defined in the 
South African context, and that the definition of empowerment needs a broader interpretation.244  
Standards and benchmarks in addition to the SRI index must be developed to provide the 
industry with measurable criteria with which to assess the merits of a particular investment and to 
measure its success in society.  It argues that the merits of prescribed asset allocation versus 
disclosure must be debated.  The Institute also recommends that the financial sector needs to 
start integrating the concepts of corporate governance, corporate citizenship and sustainability 
into its thinking and actions.  Even with the limitations of the potential effectiveness of SRIs, it 
may prove an important vehicle to increase the funds flowing into SRIs, given the importance of 
South Africa’s transformation agenda. 
 
 
                                                 
239 Social Investment Forum, supra, at 710. 
240 Sarra, supra, note 100. 
241 African Institute of Corporate Citizenship, Socially Responsible Investing in South Africa, 2001, 
www.corporatecitizenshio-africa.com. 
242 Ibid. at 7. 
243 Ibid. at 7. 
244 That is in line with the principles of NEPAD and sustainable development.  Ibid. at 9. 
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Conclusion 
 
South Africa, along with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa faces daunting economic and social 
challenges over the next decades.  However, it does have some advantages over its neighbors in 
having a much more active capital market, and tradition of corporate governance regulation 
(greatly distorted by apartheid and its economic and social inheritance).  While internal initiatives 
such as the King Reports, the JSE initiatives and the proposed new corporation law provide the 
necessary evidence of the vast reservoir of willingness to progress in corporate governance in 
South Africa, it cannot progress on its own.  Unless some international support is provided 
through debt reform, an international forum for control of MNEs’ harmful activities, and support for 
other Sub-Saharan African countries’ development of capital markets and corporate governance 
initiatives, South Africa may drown in a race to the regulatory and economic bottom by short-
sighted investors and corporate managers.  
 
There are unlimited areas for further research, including: investigation into the recent suits for 
environmental harm under the Constitution and environmental laws and the impact of these suits 
both in terms of investor chill and in remediating the environment;  study of reporting on HIV/AIDs 
in companies, including whether companies are reporting affirmative measures and whether there 
is any means to measure impact of such reporting;  exploration of new ways to legislatively draw 
aside the corporate veil and give host nations access to assets of parent MNEs where there is 
corporate malfeasance or corporate harm from the activities of the MNE in the host nation; and 
further research on African value systems and their normative upside potential for developing an 
effective domestic corporate governance regime.  There should also be further consideration of 
the proposal that a percentage of assets under management be directed to black empowerment 
and other remedial measures that would serve to rebalance the system before economic, social 
and environmental self-sustainability is possible. 
This paper has explored more challenges than solutions, although it is meant to continue the 
conversation internationally about optimal governance systems grounded in the political, social 
and economic context in which corporations operate.  The key question is whether governance 
initiatives will have any demonstrable impact on the problems highlighted here. 
